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vForeword
S
oil fertility and the lack of fertilizer use in Africa are frequently discussed topics. The
problems of land degradation and low agricultural productivity, which result in food
insecurity and poverty, are particularly severe in the rural highlands of Ethiopia. In
many areas, a downward spiral of land degradation and poverty appears to be occurring. Find-
ing solutions to these problems requires identifying effective entry points for farmers, gov-
ernments, and civil society organizations, and understanding the potential impacts and trade-
offs that are likely to arise from alternative interventions. This report seeks to improve that
understanding, using a bioeconomic model of land management and agricultural production
developed for a community that is fairly typical of the situation in the Ethiopian highlands.
The report assesses the potential impacts of several policy options on small farmers’land
management, productivity, food security, and poverty—including increased access to fertilizer
credit, food-for-work programs, other off-farm employment opportunities, and promotion of
tree planting on uncultivated land. The authors find that increased use of fertilizer credit could
help to increase agricultural productivity, food security, and income, but could undermine
farmers’ incentives to invest in soil and water conservation, leading to greater land degrada-
tion. Increased employment opportunities through food-for-work or other measures can help
to substantially increase household incomes, but would likely reduce food production and soil
conservation, unless such measures are linked to conservation requirements. Promotion of tree
planting on degraded land could increase incomes significantly without compromising food
production or soil conservation, and, if combined with conservation incentives through food-
for-work or other programs, could result in improved land management as well as increased
incomes and food security.
These findings should be useful to policymakers and others seeking to improve land man-
agement and reduce poverty in Ethiopia and other countries where such problems are severe.
Beyond this, the modeling approach developed by Stein Holden, Bekele Shiferaw, and John





his work is part of the IFPRI/ILRI project “Policies for Sustainable Land Management
in the East African Highlands.” ILRI and IFPRI have provided funds and logistical sup-
port for the work. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has provided funds for
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viiSummary
E
thiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world. Most of its population of more than
65 million people lives in the highlands, where land degradation and droughts threaten
their food security. Highland households in less-favored areas are increasingly depen-
dent on better market access or external assistance in order to avoid starvation.
Soil erosion in Ethiopia averages nearly 10 times the rate of soil regeneration, and the
country’s estimated rate of soil nutrient depletion is among the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Such land degradation reduces average agricultural productivity. It also increases farmers’
vulnerability to drought by reducing soil depth and moisture-holding capacity. The combined
effects of low productivity and ecosystem degradation lock the poor in a vicious cycle of
poverty and environmental degradation.
The risk of inadequate rainfall appears to have increased in recent years. Global climate
changes may be responsible for the recent increased incidence of drought in areas not affected
by earlier droughts. Wars and misdirected government policies have also contributed to a vi-
cious spiral of poverty, land degradation, and food insecurity.
There is a strong need for peace, better governance, and improved development policies
to help break Ethiopia’s Malthusian course and put communities onto more sustainable de-
velopment paths on which poverty is reduced and food security is improved. Especially urgent
is the need for alternative development strategies that address land degradation and food in-
security in less-favored areas, where drought risk is high or market access is poor.
The Study Area
In the Andit Tid watershed community in the eastern Amhara region of the Ethiopian high-
lands, both household welfare and land quality are deteriorating rapidly. Crop production is
highly subsistence oriented, but the trend during the past 20 years has shifted from households
as net sellers of food grains to net buyers. Recent droughts have even made the region de-
pendent on food aid. Households lack off-farm income sources to protect their livelihoods
against drought or other shocks. Significant interventions are urgently needed to diversify in-
come opportunities and reverse the alarming agro-ecosystem degradation that threatens to
destroy livelihoods.
Policy Analysis for Sustainable Land Management and Food Security presents a bio-
economic model of this less-favored area in the Ethiopian highlands. The main reason for se-
lecting this case study area is the unique availability of both biophysical and socioeconomic
data covering a period of 15–20 years. The data provide a valuable opportunity to analyze the
relationships between population pressure, poverty, and land degradation, and to test policies
for reducing vulnerability and improving sustainable management of the resource base.
Analytical Framework
Bioeconomic models are useful tools in policy analysis because they can reflect the bio-
physical as well as the socioeconomic conditions essential for decisionmaking within a specific
viii“bioeconomy.” They may be used to explore the linkages between the ecology and the econ-
omy and the dynamic effects of these linkages over time. They first capture the essential ele-
ments leading to a specific development path within a specific bioeconomy and then make it
possible to see how stable this development path is, or how sensitive it is to changes in initial
conditions. This baseline model may serve as a starting point for “policy experiments” to as-
sess the likely impact of alternative policy interventions. Such models have become increas-
ingly popular in recent years in addressing issues related to agricultural land use.
The bioeconomic model used in this study analyzes the combined effects of land degrada-
tion, population growth, market imperfections, and increased risk of drought on household
production, welfare, and food security in Andit Tid. It is also used to assess the impact of in-
creased access to credit for fertilizer, off-farm income, food-for-work (FFW) interventions,
and planting of eucalyptus trees as alternative strategies for local development.
Reducing Poverty and 
Land Degradation
The model predicts that provision and adoption of credit for fertilizer, although risky, would
lead to increased grain production and improved household welfare and food security. How-
ever, provision of credit for fertilizer has a negative effect on incentives to conserve land, re-
sulting in higher erosion rates when such unlinked credit is provided. Linking a conservation
requirement to the provision of fertilizer credit can mitigate this negative outcome. Overall,
however, even the combination of conservation structures and high levels of fertilizer use
cannot sustain crop yields, because erosion cannot be eliminated fully and soils in the area are
shallow.
Better access to off-farm income can improve household income and reduce vulnerability
to drought. It may, however, also reduce incentives for food production and land conservation.
The effects of FFW on food production and farmland conservation may vary depending on
how and for what activities FFW is used, on the characteristics of the labor market, and on the
impact of conservation technologies on short-term agricultural yields. FFW programs may
undermine food production and incentives to conserve land unless FFW is linked to land con-
servation or better land management. The participation of local communities; knowledge of
farming systems, resource distribution, local markets, and prices; and awareness of how dif-
ferent interventions affect production, conservation, and welfare are all needed to avoid program
design failures. FFW may be used to enhance food security and land conservation, provided
that programs are compatible with local priorities.
Planting trees, especially eucalyptus, on agriculturally marginal land may be a promising
option for Ethiopian farm households. When other employment opportunities are limited,
planting eucalyptus on land unsuitable for crop production may substantially increase house-
hold income if market outlets for trees can be identified. Our analysis suggests that tree
planting on marginal lands will not have severe negative effects on food production or land
conservation.
The combination of tree planting and FFW for conservation appears to produce superior
outcomes. A policy combining promotion of tree planting and conservation of cropland may
achieve win-win benefits in terms of increased household incomes as well as more sustainable
land use. Careful program design and implementation would be required to maximize such
benefits.
Finding solutions to the downward spiral of land degradation and poverty requires identify-
ing effective entry points for farmers, governments, and civil society organizations, as well as
understanding the potential impacts and tradeoffs likely to arise from alternative interventions.
SUMMARY ixOur analysis of the Andit Tid watershed community should be useful to policymakers and others
seeking to reduce poverty and improve land management in Ethiopia and other countries
where such problems are severe. Beyond this, the bioeconomic modeling approach used in




thiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world. Most of its population of more than
65 million people lives in the highlands, where land degradation and droughts cause
declining and highly variable land productivity that threatens the food security of these
people. Soil erosion has been estimated to average 42 tons per hectare per year on cultivated
lands in the highlands, nearly 10 times the rate of soil formation (Hurni 1993), and Ethiopia
has among the highest estimated rates of soil nutrient depletion in sub-Saharan Africa (Stoor-
vogel and Smaling 1990). Such land degradation not only reduces average productivity, but it
also increases farmers’vulnerability to drought by reducing soil depth and soil moisture hold-
ing capacity.
Changes in the global climate may also have caused an increase in the incidence of drought
that has occurred recently in areas that were not affected by earlier droughts. Wars and mis-
placed government policies have contributed to the vicious spiral of poverty, land degradation,
and food insecurity. There is a strong need for peace and improved policies that can help to
break the country’s Malthusian course and put communities onto more sustainable develop-
ment paths where poverty is reduced and food security improved. Especially urgent is a need
for alternative development strategies that address land degradation and food insecurity in
less-favored areas where drought risk is higher or market access is poorer (Pender et al. 2001).
Policy-makers and technology development institutions have long neglected less-favored
areas. Recent research by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) has chal-
lenged the conventional wisdom that public investments in developing countries should em-
phasize investment in favored areas (Fan and Hazell 2000; Pender and Hazell 2000; Hazell et
al. 2002). On the basis of a comparative advantage argument, IFPRI maintains that certain
types of agricultural and non-agricultural activities can give high returns and contribute sig-
nificantly to poverty reduction (Pender, Place, and Ehui 1999). A precondition is sufficient
investment in infrastructure and local institutional capacity. More research is, however, nec-
essary to investigate how large this potential is.
The behavioral and material determinants of production relationships lead to low invest-
ment levels and severe market imperfections (Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986; Binswanger,
McIntire, and Udry 1989), and these imperfections contribute to the problems of poverty and
food insecurity. Improving markets may therefore be one important element in a new policy
for sustainable development. There is nonetheless no guarantee that piecemeal improvements
of some markets will lead to economic growth and more sustainable land use. It is even pos-
sible that improved access to some markets can lead to more land degradation. This is also
consistent with the theory of second best (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956). Both the mixture and
the sequencing of policies may matter for the outcomes.
1Bioeconomic models may be useful
tools in policy analysis because they can
reflect the biophysical as well as socio-
economic conditions essential for decision-
making in a specific “bioeconomy.” They
may be used to explore the linkages be-
tween the ecology and the economy and the
dynamic effects of these linkages over time.
They may thus be used first to capture the
essential elements leading to a specific de-
velopment path in a specific bioeconomy
and to make it possible to see how stable
or sensitive this development path is to
changes in some of the initial conditions.
Second, this baseline model may serve as a
starting point for “policy experiments” to
assess the impact of alternative policy inter-
ventions. Such models have become increas-
ingly popular in recent years in addressing
issues related to agricultural land use and
intensification (e.g., Barbier and Bergeron
2001; Ruben, Kuyvenhoven, and Kruseman
2001; Shiferaw, Holden, and Aune 2001;
Okumu et al. 2002; Vosti, Witcover, and
Carpentier 2002; Holden 2004).
We have in this report developed a bio-
economic model for a “less favored,” se-
verely degraded, densely populated area with
fairly good market access in the Ethiopian
highlands. Even though the area is favor-
ably located near the main road between
Tigray and Addis Ababa, there are signifi-
cant market imperfections1 that affect land
productivity in the area (Holden et al. 2001).
We have very good biophysical as well as
socioeconomic data from this area and can
therefore rely less on theoretical assump-
tions and more on empirical reality when
constructing the model.2
Our objective is to analyze the determi-
nants of the development path in the study
area, including land degradation, population
growth, market characteristics, choice of
technology, and the implications of in-
creased production risk, using a dynamic
bioeconomic model. Furthermore, we want
to assess the impacts of alternative policies
on poverty reduction, increased food secu-
rity, and promotion of more sustainable land
use in the study area. Specifically, we assess
the impacts on land management, land deg-
radation, household production, income, and
food security of
1. Drought risk in combination with land
degradation and population growth
2. Fertilizer credit
3. Improved access to off-farm income
4. Access to food-for-work (FFW)
programs
5. Promotion of planting of eucalyptus on
land unsuitable for crop production
In Chapter 2 we briefly describe the case
study area. Some relevant issues in bio-
economic modeling are discussed and the
basic structure of the bioeconomic model
is outlined in Chapter 3, followed by a dis-
cussion of the methodology of bioeconomic
modeling in Chapter 4. The results and dis-
cussion are presented in Chapter 5, followed
by the conclusions. Adetailed description of
the model in GAMS programming language
is provided in Appendix A.
2 CHAPTER 1
1These market imperfections include imperfections in factor markets (land, labor, traction power), output markets,
and intertemporal markets (credit, insurance).
2The data availability allowed us to apply flexible functional forms when estimating many relationships instead
of relying on, for example, Cobb–Douglas production functions, or instead of assuming perfect markets or com-
pletely missing markets we specify more typical “in-between” situations with imperfectly functioning markets.CHAPTER 2
Description of the Case Study Area 
and Data
A
ndit Tid was selected by the Soil Conservation Research Programme (SCRP) in col-
laboration with the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture as one of seven research stations
in order to study as many different agro-climatic zones and land-use systems as pos-
sible in the Ethiopian highlands (Ludi 1997). Andit Tid is located approximately 60 kilometers
east of Debre Berhan, along the main road between Addis Ababa and the Tigray Region, in
East Shewa in the central Ethiopian highlands. This implies that the market access is fairly
good. The area is classified as belonging to the low-potential cereal–livestock zone and is se-
verely degraded. It is a high-altitude area (>3,000 meters above sea level [m.a.s.l.]). The land
is located in two altitude zones: dega zone (<3,200 m.a.s.l.) and wurch zone (>3,200 m.a.s.l.).
The average rainfall is 1,336 mm per year, distributed over two growing seasons, the meher
season from June to November and the belg season from January to May. Droughts were not
common in the area until very recently, when the belg rains failed in two consecutive years
(1999 and 2000). Hailstorms and frost, however, have often damaged crops.
The two dominant soil types are andosols and regosols. Andosols dominate in the wurch
zone while regosols dominate in the dega zone. Andosols are rich in organic matter. The grass
turf is collected in heaps and burnt3 before barley is planted. This releases nutrients for the
crop but also causes considerable losses of organic matter and soil nitrogen. Yohannes (1989)
estimated 75 percent of the land to be on steep slopes (>25 percent slope). Soil erosion rates
in the area are very high, and a large share of the land has shallow soils, causing reduction of
soil depth, which affects crop rooting depth and thus yields (Shiferaw and Holden 2001).
Holden and Shiferaw (2000) estimated 21 percent of the land to have shallow soils (<30 centi-
meters soil depth) and 48 percent to be of medium depth (30–60 centimeters).
Various forms of conservation technologies are common in the area. They have been partly
introduced through external food-for-work (FFW) programs. The farmers later removed more
than 50 percent of the externally introduced conservation structures. Shiferaw and Holden
(1998) found that human population pressure (land scarcity) increased the probability that
conservation structures were partly or fully removed. The reasons for this were thought to be
that the conservation structures did not contribute to increased yields in the short run, the struc-
tures occupied some land and therefore reduced the effective planting area, and the structures
collected fertile soils that could be used to increase short-run production by dismantling the
structures and spreading out the soil collected there. The structures could also harbor rats that
may damage the crops.
3Locally called gaay.
3The main crop in the area is barley, fol-
lowed by wheat, horse beans, and field peas.
Lentils and linseeds are also commonly
grown. Most of the crop production takes
place in the dega zone, but barley is also
grown in the wurch zone in the belg season.
Cattle and sheep are the dominant types
of livestock, but goats, equines, and chickens
are also common. The animal population
density is very high in the area; Yohannes
(1989) estimated it to be 1.48 tropical live-
stock units (TLU)4 per hectare, compared to
0.36 as the average for the Ethiopian high-
lands. We found this density to have in-
creased to 2.03 TLU per hectare in 1998 but
it declined to 1.71 by the end of 1999 be-
cause of the drought (Holden and Shiferaw
2000). Fifty-three percent of the sampled
households surveyed in 2000 had two or
more oxen, 25 percent had one ox, and 22
percent had no oxen. The two-or-more-oxen
household group farmed close to 70 percent
of the land area and the no-oxen group close
to 10 percent of the area.
The population density of the study area
was estimated to be 230 persons per square
kilometer of cultivable land in 1999 and was
estimated to be 145.5 persons per square
kilometer in 1986 (Yohannes 1989). The
average population density was 61 persons
per square kilometer for the Ethiopian high-
lands (Yohannes 1989). The population
growth rate was estimated to be 3.0 percent
per year, indicating a rapidly increasing
population pressure.
Production of crops is well integrated
with production of livestock in the area.
Oxen are the dominant source of traction
power. Hand cultivation is used only on very
steep slopes inaccessible by oxen. Animal
manure is used for fuel or as fertilizer on
crops. Sale of animals is an important source
of cash income. Crop residues are used as
animal fodder. Fodder is otherwise obtained
from fallow land and grazing land, but only
a small share of this (5 percent) is from
communal land. Fodder shortage is an im-
portant constraint, and purchase of fodder
and use of cut-and-carry systems are the
main strategies to overcome this problem,
besides limiting the number of animals kept
(Holden and Shiferaw 2000).
The land resources (land of different
quality) are fairly evenly distributed in the
area owing to frequent land redistributions
in Ethiopia since the 1970s in which land
was allocated based on household size.
Livestock possession is therefore a better
indicator of household wealth and wealth
differentiation. Oxen ownership in particu-
lar signifies the farming capacity of house-
holds, as the rental market for oxen for
plowing is highly imperfect (Holden and
Shiferaw 2000; Holden, Shiferaw, and Pen-
der 2001). It also leads to the typical pattern
in which households without oxen rent out
land to households with two oxen or more,
while households with one ox exchange oxen
among themselves. Land renting typically
takes place in the form of share tenancy, in
which the share to the owner varies between
0.5 and 0.25 depending on land quality.
Households may have access to credit in
kind for purchase of fertilizers but are reluc-
tant to take this kind of credit even though
it appears profitable to do so (based on data
obtained from the extension agent in the
area, we found barley responded well to fer-
tilizer but wheat did not because of the high
risk of frost damage).5 Risk and high aver-
sion to this type of risk cause households to
be reluctant to buy fertilizer on credit.
Households have limited access to off-
farm income sources. Crop production is
highly subsistence oriented, but the trend
during the last 20 years has shifted from
4 CHAPTER 2
4One TLU is equivalent to one 250-kilogram animal.
5Credit utilization was found to be significantly positively correlated with number of educated males in the house-
hold, household size, land loss in recent land redistribution, and male sex of household head, and negatively cor-
related with livestock ownership and size of male labor force.households being net sellers of food grains
to being net buyers. The recent droughts
have even made the area dependent on food
aid (Holden and Shiferaw 2000).
The main reasons for selecting this case
study area for bioeconomic modeling was
the unique availability of both biophysical
and socioeconomic data covering a greater
than 15-year period. The SCRP started col-
lection of biophysical data when a field
station was established in 1982. These data
included soil erosion data at plot and water-
shed levels, yield measurements, conserva-
tion technology experiments, soil chemical
and physical analyses, and meteorological
data. Household survey data were collected
in 1986, 1993/94, 1997/98, and 1999/2000.
These surveys also included detailed data
collection at the farm plot level. The data
provided a unique opportunity to analyze
carefully the relationships between popu-
lation pressure, poverty, land degradation,
conservation, household production, and
welfare, including food security.




here is a growing interest in using bioeconomic models as a tool for policy analysis
to better understand pathways of development and to assess the impact of alternative
policies on the natural resource base and human welfare (Barbier and Bergeron 2001;
Ruben, Kuyvenhoven, and Kruseman 2001; Shiferaw, Holden, and Aune 2001; Okumu et al.
2002; Holden et al. 2003; Holden, Shiferaw, and Pender 2004). One of the potential benefits
of these models is that one can get a better and more comprehensive indication of the feed-
back effects between human activity and natural resources. Modern computer power permits
development of complex models far beyond what was possible only a few years ago. It has
therefore become possible to make models that are theoretically more consistent and empiri-
cally more accurate.
The novelty of the model presented here is that it is a dynamic non-separable household
model that simultaneously integrates economic optimization in production and consumption
with intertemporal environmental feedbacks, allowing for nonlinearities in constraints as well
as the objective function. Some other bioeconomic models have not been truly dynamic, as
they have incorporated future impacts through sustainability constraints or user costs only
(Holden 1993a,b; Shiferaw and Holden 1999, 2000; Kruseman 2000). This model is dynamic,
that is, the households maximize discounted utility over a limited time horizon.
Earlier bioeconomic models have either been biological process models that do not incor-
porate human behavior in a comprehensive way through optimization; economic optimization
models linked, although not simultaneously, to a biological simulation component; or models
that resort to perfect market assumptions allowing a single decision maker to represent a large
number of heterogeneous households (e.g., Okumu et al. 2002). While the latter may be a good
simplification in bioeconomies in which markets function reasonably well, such models may not
be a good representation of low-resource bioeconomies, as in the northern Ethiopian highlands,
where markets typically are highly imperfect. The assumption of perfect markets results in sep-
arability of production behavior from consumption behavior (Singh, Squire, and Strauss 1986)
and was therefore convenient and computationally necessary until recently. Theoretical and em-
pirical research has shown that market imperfections have significant impacts on production de-
cisions in low-resource agriculture, and this gives reason to question work based on perfect mar-
ket assumptions. Rather, one should carefully examine the market characteristics, as they can
alter not only the size but also the direction of responses of key outcome variables (de Janvry,
Fafchamps, and Sadoulet 1991; Sadoulet and de Janvry 1995; Holden and Binswanger 1998).
Market imperfections and heterogeneity of resources across households cause land use
at plot level to depend on household resources in the study area (Holden, Shiferaw, and Pender
62001). Models are therefore developed for
different more homogeneous household cat-
egories.6 The household data are carefully
aggregated and checked for consistency
across groups to resemble the actual pattern
of household interactions through their
participation in imperfect factor and output
markets. These market imperfections include
limited access to off-farm employment, price
bands for outputs and labor, a constrained
rental market for land through share ten-
ancy, oxen rental through exchange with
labor only, and constrained access to formal
credit in kind (for fertilizer) or to informal
credit at a high interest rate.
The model also incorporates risk-averse
behavior through a constant partial relative
risk aversion utility function, production risk
due to drought, and downside risk aversion
to taking credit for fertilizer. Drought also
affects prices for crops and livestock and
price expectations (covariate risk), and these
have additional effects on household pro-
duction and welfare.
Earlier optimization models were criti-
cized for being linear while the reality they
were supposed to represent was highly non-
linear. While piecewise linear representa-
tions of nonlinear relationships may serve as
good and efficient approximations, the re-
cent advances allowing for large nonlinear
optimization models make optimization
models more credible.
The model endogenizes the effects of
land degradation in the form of soil erosion
and nutrient depletion on household deci-
sions; that is, the effects of land degradation
on expected future productivity are taken
into account in farmers’ current decisions.
The availability of biophysical data from
conservation experiments in the study area
allows us to estimate erosion rates as well
as crop productivity responses on different
soils in the study area. The model further-
more integrates crop and livestock inter-
actions. Crop choice, building or removal
of conservation structures on different types
of land, fertilizer use, and manure use are
endogenous decisions that affect the rate of
land degradation. These decisions affect
erosion and nutrient depletion rates that
again determine crop productivity in later
years.7
Agricultural production takes place in
two cropping seasons per year, the meher
and belg seasons. Recently, the belg season
rains have failed in several consecutive
years, although this was rare in the past. We
attempt to model the effects of this new
type of risk. The covariate drought risk also
has consequences for market prices of agri-
cultural commodities. Farm households face
high cereal prices in drought years when
they are likely to be net buyers of cereals. At
the same time, livestock prices are depressed
because many have to sell their animals to
buy cereals or because of their inability to
feed their animals. Expected incomes in nor-
mal years and drought years are therefore
based on the expected outputs and expected
prices in these two states of nature.
Model Description
Earlier versions of this model include those
of Shiferaw, Holden, and Aune (2000, 2001).
The main extensions of the model presented
here are the introduction of risk due to
stochastic rainfall, a better representation of
the market imperfections found in the area,
a better calibration of the model to the ac-
tual conditions in the area based on new sur-
vey data (Holden and Shiferaw 2000), and
numerous minor adjustments improving the
theoretical consistency of the model and its
validity in terms of the model’s ability to
replicate the current and recent land use and
household welfare in the study area.
THE BIOECONOMIC MODEL 7
6We focus only on one household group in this report, the dominant land user group, those with two or more oxen.
7Adynamic effect that the model does not capture is the beneficial impact of crop rotation, for example, the resid-
ual effect of leguminous crops.We present here the basic theoretical
structure of the model. Figure 3.1 gives an
illustration of the main elements of the
model. P in the figure stands for policy in-
terventions that we will come back to later.
The household model represents an av-
erage household in a household group,
where the households in the study area have
been divided into three relatively homoge-
neous groups based on oxen ownership, as
oxen are the most vital privately owned
resource. Oxen distribution is more skewed
than the land distribution, and the number
of oxen is also an important determinant of
whether households participate in land
rental markets. We leave out the household
group subscripts in the exposition below to
keep the notation simple.
Objective Function






through a time-separable utility function over
the time horizon T. Utility in period t is dis-
counted by the discount factor,




where δ is the utility discount rate.8
Utility in period t is represented by a
constant partial relative risk aversion utility
function:
ut = (1 – µ)Yt
1–µ + µ – 1, (2)
where µ is the partial relative risk aversion
or absolute value of the elasticity of mar-
ginal utility of certainty equivalent full in-
come,9 Yt, which is equal to
Yi = E(It) – ψ1t – ψ2t, (3)
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8The discount rate was set to vary inversely with the income of households but was in the range 26–29 percent
for the simulations with the two-oxen households.
9This type of utility function has been used by Binswanger (1980, 1981, 1982) in his empirical study of risk pref-
erences of farmers. It has the advantage that risk aversion can be captured by a single parameter. In most of our






















Production and investment decisions
•  livestock mix for each land type
•  crop choice
•  to conserve or not to conserve
•  fertilizer use
•  manure use
•  tree planting
Land degradation
soil erosion
nutrient depletionwhere E(It) is normalized expected full in-
come in period t, ψ1t is a “downside” risk
premium related to obtaining formal credit,
and ψ2t is a risk premium related to drought
risk in the belg season.10 Full income was
normalized by the poverty line full income
(γt), while the risk premiums were normal-
ized by the poverty line (ζt), excluding value
of leisure:
E(It) = E(yt)/γt, (4)
where  E(yt) is the expected full income
(measured in Ethiopian birr) in period t.
Subsistence leisure, Lemin, is valued at the
minimum wage rate, w γt, required for the
work force of the household, taking out only
the subsistence level of leisure, to generate
an income exactly equal to the poverty line
income:
w γt = ζt /Lmax, (5)
where Lmax is the maximum time available
for work and ζt is the poverty line income
excluding the value of leisure. The time en-
dowment, F t, of the household may then be
formulated as follows:
F t = Lemin + Lmax (6)
and poverty line full income is:
γt = w γtFt. (7)
This formulation gives utility equal to zero
if the household has Yt = 1, gives negative
utility if Yt is below the poverty line (Yt < 1),
and positive utility if Yt > 1.11 Population
growth12 affects the time endowment (labor
force) and consumer units and thus poverty
line income, causing these to grow propor-
tionally over time.
We are interested in the welfare changes
of households over time. We define a Bose-
rupian development path (Boserup 1965)
as a path where utility, ut, grows over time,
and a Malthusian development path (Mal-
thus 1987) as a path where utility declines
over time.13The requirement for a Boserup-
ian development path is then that income
grows faster than the population, since Yt is
a measure of per capita income in period t.
The risk premiums are calculated as fol-
lows, using a Taylor expansion and approx-
imation over the utility function (Sadoulet
and de Janvry 1995):
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simulations we used µ = 3. This was based on a modified method to elicit risk preferences of individual house-
hold members, similar to the experimental approach used by Binswanger, but using only hypothetical questions
related to choice between staple food crops with different expected outputs and risk and stated probabilities of
good and bad (drought) years.
10When it comes to the drought and credit risks, they are treated as additively separable risks. There are two rainy
seasons per year. Drought occurs during the short belg rain season. During a drought it will not rain enough to
make it possible for farmers to plant and apply fertilizer. They will always plant in the long rains (meher season).
The credit risk does not relate to drought but to the risk of hailstorms or frost damaging the crops where fertilizer
has been applied (implying no drought).
11This implies that we have taken risk into account in the measurement of poverty/welfare of households. We
therefore consider a risk-averse person with an uncertain expected income of I poorer than a risk-averse person with
a certain income of I. This is not yet a common approach but we refer to Cruces and Wodon (2003) for a recent
application of this approach to directly incorporate risk into the measurement of income, and therefore poverty.
12A population growth rate of 2 percent per year is used. This rate is lower than the average national rate for
Ethiopia. We set it lower owing to the high population pressure in the area and the growing food deficit that may
lead to more out-migration.
13The trend must be evaluated over a period of several years, as short-term disturbances may otherwise cover the
trend. The non-stochastic approach chosen allows us to assess the trend and the factors affecting the trend more
carefully.ψ1t = ψ1t(µ, µd, C ft, i, ζt, E(It)) 
= 0.5(µ + µd)[(Cft(1 + i))2/
ζt]E(It)
(8)
ψ2t = ψ2t(µ, var(It), ζt, It) 
= 0.5[var(It)/ζt]E(It),
(9)
where µd is the additional risk aversion re-
lated to credit risk,14 Ct is the amount of
credit taken in period t, i is the interest rate,
and var(It) is the variance of income. Vari-
ance of income is computed on the basis of
outcomes in good and bad years (drought
years) and the probability of drought. This
implies that variance of income also de-
pends on crop choice and land degradation/
conservation decisions.
Market Characteristics
We have the following market characteristics
in the models. We leave out the subscript for
year to simplify the notation.
Credit Market. Formal credit in kind for fer-
tilizer that is constrained from above:
pf Fe = Cf ≤ C ¯
f , (10)
where  pf is the price of fertilizer, Fe is
quantity of fertilizer, Cf is credit taken for
fertilizer, and C ¯
f is the maximum quantity
of fertilizer credit that the household can
obtain. This credit must be repaid after
harvest (seasonal credit only). It may also
be possible to obtain informal credit (Ci)
within the village at a higher rate of interest:
Ci ≤ C ¯
i. (11)
This credit must also be paid back within
the same year. Holden and Shiferaw (2000)
found that 42 percent of the households
surveyed in Andit Tid stated that they had
access to credit for farm input purchase,
while 28 percent stated that they had access
to credit for consumption purposes (infor-
mal credit).
Labor Market. Households are assumed to
have constrained access to non-farm employ-
ment, and the wage rate in the labor market
varies across seasons (observed seasonal
variation is included in the model). House-
holds may also hire labor for work on the
farm. Hired labor is not a perfect substitute
for family labor, however, as there are
search, screening, and monitoring costs re-
lated to hiring labor (Feder 1985; Sadoulet
and de Janvry 1995). Likewise, there are
search costs related to finding off-farm em-
ployment. Atransaction cost related to hiring
labor of about 10–20 percent of the wage
rate is added to capture this.15 The house-
hold shadow wage, w*
p, should fall between
the buying wage (wbp) and the selling wage
(wsp) when households do not participate
and are not rationed out of the labor market:
wsp ≤ w*
p ≤ wbp. (12)
Empirical evidence seems to indicate that
there are limited off-farm employment op-
portunities, however, and households may
therefore be rationed out of the labor market.
This may cause the shadow wage in agri-
culture to fall below the market wage rate.
This is a classical issue in development eco-
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14Many farmers in the area feared to take credit because of past experiences with repayment problems when crops
failed, forcing them to sell their livestock, and there were even reported cases of imprisonment. Unlike in the
credit-insurance literature, the credit did not contribute to consumption smoothing in our case study area. This is
similar to what Boucher and Carter (2001) have called “risk rationing” where the lenders shift so much contrac-
tual risk to the borrowers that they voluntarily withdraw from the credit market. The specification is also in line
with the findings in risk preference studies comparing the results of games with gains only with games with gains
and losses. People were found to be more risk averse in the latter case (Binswanger and Sillers 1983; Wik et al.
2004).
15The width of the price band was kept constant but the wage rates fluctuated seasonally.nomics that dates back to the Lewis model
(Lewis 1954) and the efficiency wage the-
ory (Leibenstein 1957, 1958). There are
nutrition-based and learning-based expla-
nations for the failure of the market wage
to fall sufficiently to clear the market. We
think that the nutrition-based explanation is
plausible in Ethiopia. Clark and Haswell
(1970, cited in Ray 1998, p. 273) provide
estimates of energy requirements for agri-
cultural work (from West Africa) in the
range of 213–502 kilocalories per hour of
work, showing a clear rationale for a mini-
mum wage. This creates an equilibrium
minimum wage through which some indi-
viduals are rationed out (involuntary un-
employment) because they are not capable
of supplying the labor at a lower wage (Ray
1998, p. 493). This is also consistent with
the assumption that households are drudgery
averse (Chayanov 1966; Nakajima 1986).
Based on Nakajima’s theory (1986), we
have assumed that the shadow wage (reser-
vation wage) is an increasing function of the
time worked and that there is a trade-off
between income and leisure. Indifference
curves between income and leisure will be
upward sloping and convex in labor and
income space. Household preferences for
leisure in income-labor space are formulated
as a reservation wage curve that is convex
and upward sloping and calibrated (βs in
equation [13]) to fit the observed seasonal
labor supply/leisure demand and wage rates
in the area, and does not fall below a mini-
mum level:
w*




p ≤ L ¯
p (13c)
L*
p = LpF – LpH + LpO (13d)
LpF = LpC + LpL (13e)
LpT = L*
p + LpE, (13f)
where βs are parameters, Dp is the sea-
sonal family labor divided by the household
labor force (W), Lp is the maximum sea-
sonal time that is available for work,16 LpC
is seasonal labor in crop production, LpL is
seasonal labor in livestock production, LpO
is seasonal off-farm family labor, L*
p is total
seasonal family labor, LpF is total seasonal
on-farm labor, LpH is hired-in labor, LpT is
the total seasonal time endowment, and LpE
is the seasonal leisure time. Labor for con-
servation (building of new structures, main-
tenance of structures, and removal of old
structures) is included in LpC. Seasonal non-
farm family labor may be constrained or
unconstrained (alternative simulations) but
it can take place in any season of the year.
Seasonal access to food-for-work (FFW)
employment was also included in some
simulations.
Land Market. There is an informal rental
market for land in the area. This market is
interlinked with the output market as the
rent is paid in form of a share of the output
(share tenancy). It is typically households
without oxen that are forced to rent out part
of their land to households with two or more
oxen. The scarcity of land in the area, in com-
bination with the stickiness of the “price” in
form of share of the output, causes demand
(denoted by superscript d) for land to ex-
ceed supply (Holden and Shiferaw 2000). A
good reputation is important to be able to
rent in land. For households renting in land,
denoted by superscript 2, we get
A2
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16Maximum time available for farm work is determined by subtracting religious holidays from the total number





qo is a vector of operated land hold-
ing (subscript o) by land type (subscript q);
A ¯
qw is a vector of owned land (subscript w)
by land quality class; and A2
qr is land rented
in (subscript r is for rented land), which is
supply constrained given the shares of the
output, (α ¯
q), that have to be paid to the
owner. Typically, these shares were equal
to 0.5 for the best-quality land, 0.33 for
the medium-quality land, and 0.25 for poor-
quality land. There was excess demand
(A2d
qr ) for each of these shares. Λ is the rela-
tive population weight for households rent-
ing out versus households renting in land.
For households renting out land, denoted by
superscript 0, we have:
A0




The third constraint in equation (14) will
therefore bind as area demanded exceeds
supply in the second constraint in equation
(14). In the version of the model that is pre-
sented in this report we include only the
two-oxen households and impose constraints
on their access to land to rent in, based on
observed access.
Oxen Rental Market. Households that rent
out land do so because they lack oxen and
are unable to borrow or rent in oxen to cul-
tivate the land themselves. Oxen owners are
reluctant to rent out their oxen owing to
moral hazard problems and the risk of their
oxen being mismanaged. Oxen may be
borrowed or rented (OxrP), from relatives
or close neighbors, usually in exchange for
labor (Llop) (interlinked markets).17 Access
to oxen in this way may be constrained as
indicated in the equation (16b). Seasonal
oxen working days (Oxop) is therefore the
sum of the working days by owned oxen
(Oxwp) and the amount of oxen days rented
in or out during the period. Oxen labor days
from owned oxen is limited by the number
of religious holidays in the month:
Oxop = Oxwp ± Oxrp (16a)
wloLlop = Oxrp ≤ O ¯ xrp (16b)
Oxwp ≤ O ¯ xwp. (16c)
The cost of keeping oxen relates to their
purchasing or breeding cost, fodder demand,
and the labor cost of looking after them.
Fodder Market. Fodder is supplied by crop
residues, grass production on grazing land
and fallow land, and purchased fodder.
Households may decide to buy or sell fod-
der depending on their farm size, land allo-
cation choices, the size of their livestock,
and the price and availability of fodder. The
supply of fodder (Fo) in dry matter through
own production and purchase (Fod) is
Fo = κθyiCrAqACr + κFod|P fo (17)
Fod ≤ F ¯o,
where θyiCrAq is a vector of crop residues
or fodder yields for different crops, includ-
ing grass and fallow land, for different land
types, and κ is a vector of dry matter con-
version factors. Land scarcity appeared to
cause fodder scarcity in the area, as house-
holds appeared to have incentives to keep
more animals than they could feed well
throughout the year. We therefore im-
posed a fodder supply constraint in the
model (F ¯o).
Seeds Market. It is assumed that markets for
seeds function well but a price band is in-
cluded, making the price of purchased seeds
5 percent higher than the selling price for
seeds. Households also have the option of
storing seeds from their own harvest for the
next season.
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17Usually 2 man-days of labor are required for 1 day of work with a pair of oxen.Output Markets. Output markets are as-
sumed to function well, but a price band is
included such that the purchase price is




The main forms of land degradation in the
model are in the form of soil erosion and
soil nutrient depletion. Plot-level soil erosion
per unit of land (seAq) is a function of soil
type, soil depth and slope (land type class,
Aq), rainfall (ψ r), crop choice (Cr), and use
of conservation technology (Ψ):
seAq = se(Aq, ψ r, Cr, Ψ). (18)
Soil erosion rates were determined based on
field experiments carried out by the Soil
Conservation Research Program (SCRP) in
the study area.18 Farmers may influence soil
erosion rates through their crop choice/land
use or by building or removing conservation
technologies on the different types of land.
The model implicitly evaluates the profit-
ability of erosion control on the different
types of land, for example, on regosols ver-
sus andosols, on shallow soils versus deep
soils, and on very steep land versus less
steep land. Soil erosion affects soil depth
(sd) through a transition equation (leaving
out the land type subscript):
sdt = sdt–1 – τset, (19)
where τ is a conversion factor. Nutrient de-
pletion in the model focuses on the nutrients
nitrogen and phosphorus, which are consid-
ered to be the main nutrients limiting crop
production in the area. The balance or de-
pletion per unit of land at plot level depends
on the land/soil type, the stock of nutrients
in the soil, crop choice, conservation technol-
ogy use, yield, application of fertilizer and
manure, and the release of nutrients from
the soil.19 Nutrients are also lost through
eroded soil, and this soil is richer in nutri-
ents than the soil remaining behind.20 Re-
lease of nitrogen from the soil is assumed
to depend on the stock of nitrogen.21 The
change in nitrogen stock is given by
Nt+1 = Nt – ϕ(Nt – η(set)) – η(set), (20)
where N is nitrogen stock, ϕ is the share of
nitrogen mineralized in each period, and η
is the nitrogen composition of the soil.22 The
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18It may be questioned whether the erosion experiments captured the inflow of soils and not only the outflow, that
is, whether soil accumulation may have occurred somewhere in the watershed. Conservation structures definitely
captured much of the eroded soils, and this was likely to have a positive impact on crop yields. The topography
was such that it did not allow much soil accumulation in the valley bottoms that could benefit crop production.
The model is calibrated based on erosion, conservation technology, and yield experiments on different soil types
and slope classes over several years. These experiments should also capture much of the spatial movement of
soils. We cannot claim that these experiments provide unbiased estimates but it is the best scientific information
available. Soil formation, which typically is very low compared to the erosion rates, is also ignored. Spatial ex-
ternality effects may be underestimated, but may, however, be either positive or negative in terms of how they
affect crop yields. They may, for example, contribute to gully formation and sediment accumulation, which neg-
atively affect yields.
19Manure enters the production function only in form of nutrients and is therefore a substitute for fertilizer. Its
additional effects on soil structure, infiltration, and moisture holding capacity may cause manure to be comple-
mentary to fertilizer, however. More research is required to provide good data on this effect.
20An enrichment factor of 2 is used for nitrogen.
21We assume that 1 percent of the nitrogen stock is released each year (Shiferaw et al. 2000).
22This assumes that all fertilizer nitrogen applied is lost and does not accumulate in the system. Fertilizer use con-
tributes to fodder production that again may lead to an increase in livestock and manure production, and this may
have a positive impact on crop productivity in subsequent years.change in plant available nitrogen from pe-
riod to period (φ) due to nutrient depletion is
computed as
φ = ϕ(Nt – Nt–1). (21)
This reduction in plant available nitrogen is
included into the production function (equa-
tion [24]). The nutrients in animal manure
are released over 2 years, with 60 percent
being released in the first year and the rest
in the following year and contribute to the
overall nutrient supply for crop production
together with fertilizer nitrogen:
N F = λFe + 0.6ϑMat + 0.4ϑMat–1, (22)
where λ is the nitrogen content of fertilizer,
Ma is manure, and ϑ is nitrogen content in
manure. The effects of nitrogen and rooting
depth depletion on yields are therefore in-
cluded while the effect of phosphorus de-
pletion is not included because incorpora-
tion of this effect requires additional data
on phosphorus fixation, conversion of sta-
bile phosphorus to labile phosphorus, and
the total phosphorus stock in the soil.
Households may decide to conserve their
land by introducing conservation structures
(graded soil/stone bunds). Only labor is
needed as an input for this, 100–120 work-
ing days per hectare, depending on the slope
of the land. Maintenance of the structures
requires an additional 15–20 working days
per year per hectare. Households may also
decide to remove conservation structures,
and this is estimated to require only 25 per-
cent of the time required for construction.
The conservation structures may occupy
some productive land, thereby reducing the
effective cropping area, which may reduce
initial crop yields (Shiferaw, Holden, and
Aune 2000). Two formulations of the model
are used here: (1) one in which the yield loss
is negligible and (2) one in which initial
yields are reduced by 5–10 percent depen-
ding on the slope of the land. Building or
removing conservation structures may there-
fore affect long-term as well as short-term
yields.23 The long-term yields are affected
by the impact on land degradation (soil ero-
sion and nutrient depletion) and the feed-
back through crop yields.
Crop Production
Yields for the different crops are functions
of soil type, soil depth, slope, application of
fertilizer and manure converted into nitro-
gen and phosphorus, and conservation tech-
nology (Ψ). The intercept of the yield (yiint)
in the yield (yi) function, suppressing the
crop type and year, is a function of soil type
(Aq) and soil depth (sd):
yiint = yi(Aq, sd), (23)
and the yield by soil type is
yiAq = yi(yiint, Ψ, N F, φ, P F), (24)
where NF is fertilizer and manure nitrogen
added, φ is the change in available mineral-
ized nitrogen,24 and P F is phosphorus added
through fertilizers and manure. Yields may
be influenced by conservation technologies
(Ψ) as conservation structures take up some
part of the land; may harbor pests; and may
reduce runoff, leaching, and, of course, ero-
sion. The short-term effect on yields of the
use of conservation technologies is there-
fore ambiguous, but over time yields under
conservation should decline less rapidly than
without conservation. More information on
this can be found in Shiferaw and Holden
(2001).
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23Conservation structures may also increase short-term yields in some cases because of a moisture conservation
effect or better protection in case of excess rainfall.
24This term comes in as a reduction in the stock of nitrogen that is mineralized and therefore available for plant
growth. This reduction reduces productivity over time.The formulation implies that fertilizer
and conservation technologies are substi-
tutes in production as fertilizer may be used
to compensate for lost nutrients through
erosion when conservation technologies are
not used. There may also be complementary
effects of combining fertilizer and conser-
vation technologies as conservation tech-
nologies may improve fertilizer utilization.
We have no experimental or other data from
the study area, however, that can help us to
quantify this effect.
Crop choice will depend on the profit-
ability (prices and yields), food, fodder, se-
curity, labor demand and distribution, the
suitability of the different types of land, ac-
cess to inputs such as traction power and
fertilizer, and the property right to or rental
arrangement for the land. The crops grown
in the area include barley, wheat, field pea,
horse bean, lentil, and linseed. Land may
also be planted with eucalyptus trees or grass
or left fallow. All the crops may be grown in
the meher (main rainy) season but only bar-
ley, field peas, and lentils are grown in the
belg (small rainy) season.
Livestock Production
Cattle, sheep, goats, equines, and chicken
are the common livestock types in the area.
All these, except equines, are included in the
model. The productivity of the livestock,
birth rates, mortality, feed requirements, milk
production, plowing capacity, manure pro-
duction, culling rates, and labor and other
input costs were included. For example, cat-
tle are divided into male and female calves,
bulls, heifers, cows, and oxen. The models
are calibrated to the average livestock hold-
ing for the different household groups (with
the groups representing households owning
no, one, or two oxen), to the productivity
and lifetime of the local breeds of livestock.
To simplify the model solution, the number
of animals in each category is treated as a
continuous number, not an integer.25 This
applies to rearing, purchase, slaughter, and
sale of animals. Adult animals kept in a spe-
cific period are computed as
LVP t+1 = (1 – ς – m)LVP t + LVBt+1
+ LCRt – LVSt+1,
(25)
where LVP is animals kept in production, ς
is culling rate, mis mortality rate, LVB is an-
imals bought, LVR is young animals reared
into adult animals, and LVS is animals sold.
Production of young animals is computed as
bLVP ft = LVRt + LVRCt + LVRSt, (26)
where b is the birth rate, LVP f are female an-
imals in reproductive age, LVRC is young
animals consumed, and LVRS is young ani-
mals sold. These equations are adjusted for
different animal types depending on the time
required in different age classes and their re-
production characteristics (determined from
survey data and literature).
The decision to buy or sell animals may
depend on livestock productivity, mortality
rates, buying and selling prices, fodder avail-
ability, cash constraints, food requirements
and preferences, and other costs and bene-
fits related to keeping of animals. To avoid
complete disinvestments at the terminal year,
the model is constrained to such that not
more than 20 percent of the stock can be
sold in the terminal year.
Crop–Livestock Interactions
Livestock provide traction power and ma-
nure for crop production. A large share of
the animal manure from cattle is used for
fuel, reducing the amount available for crop
production. Crop residues, on the other hand,
are an important source of animal fodder.
Stover yields are modeled to be a function
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25This may result in the model predicting more livestock investment or disinvestments than occurs in reality,
because of the indivisibility of livestock investment (especially cattle) and cash or credit constraints that likely
inhibit such investment.of crop type and crop grain yields. Crop
choice; crop management, for example, use
of fertilizer and animal manure; and land
degradation therefore also indirectly affect
fodder yields. Total fodder production and
purchased feeds must satisfy the livestock
dry matter feed requirements:
Fo = κθyiCrAqAq + κFod ≥ξ LVP, (27)
where ξ is a vector of dry matter require-
ments for different types of animals and
LVP is a vector of animals kept of different
types and age classes. Animal manure avail-
able for crop production is calculated as
Ma = εLVP, (28)
where ε is a vector of the farmyard manure
production per animal by animal type that is
utilized as farmyard manure (excluding the
part used for fuel).
Household Consumption
An extended quadratic expenditure system,
including consumption of food grains,
pulses, other consumption, and farm input
expenditure, was estimated based on con-
sumption data from the 1994 household sur-
vey. The quadratic expenditure system gave
a better fit than alternative expenditure sys-
tems (linear, log-lin, lin-log). The results of
the estimation are presented in Table 3.1.
This system does not satisfy exact aggrega-
tion. Only the food grain and input expendi-
ture equations were included in the model.
The food consumption equations follow:
pgXg = a1 + a2E(I) + a3E(I)2 (29a)
Xg = XP g + XBg + XSg (29b)
Xg ≥ Xgmin (29c)
nuXg ≥ Numin, (29d)
where P g is a vector of food prices; Xg is a
vector of foods consumed; a1, a2, a3 are ex-
penditure system parameters; XP g is own
production retained for consumption (net of
sold and stored seeds) of the commodities;
XBg is purchased consumption; and XSg is
stored produce from the previous period
which is consumed during a given period.
The last two equations include the addi-
tional food preference and minimum energy,
fat, and protein requirement equations. Al-
though we have suppressed the time sub-
scripts in these equations, it is important
to remember that population growth affects
the number of consumers in the household
and therefore the minimum food require-
ment that grows proportionally with popula-
tion growth.
Full Income and Cash Constraints
The expected full income is the sum of ex-
pected crop and livestock production values





+ (1 – Φ)pe
CGyie
CrAqGAq
– p qcQc + (Φpe
LB (30)
+ (1 – Φ)pe
LG)yiLLVP
– p qLQL + wpoOF + w*
pLe,
where  pe
C and  pe
L are vectors of expected
prices26 for crop and livestock27 produc-
tion, with the subscripts B and G indicating
drought and non-drought years, yie
CrAq is ex-
pected yield by crop and land type, Φ is the
probability of drought, p qc and p qL are prices
16 CHAPTER 3
26The expected prices and expected quantities depend on the state of nature and the probability of drought
(weighted prices).
27The loss in livestock wealth in drought years is captured through the livestock price in the model that largely
may be due to poorer quality animals being brought to the market (lower weight, less meat relative to bones)
(McCarthy, personal communication).of inputs in crop and livestock production,
QC and QL are vectors of non-labor input
quantities in crop and livestock production,
wpo is a vector of seasonal wage rates in off-
farm employment, and OF is a vector of
seasonal participation in the labor market.
The cash constraint for farm input pur-
chase is derived from the extended quad-
ratic expenditure system. The quadratic term
was insignificant and was therefore left out
(Table 3.1).
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Table 3.1 Results of the quadratic expenditure system used in the model: 
Seemingly unrelated regression
Equation Observations Parameters RMSE R2 χ χ2 P
Barley 80 4 287.4327 0.7871 305.9059 0.0000
Wheat 80 4 118.3131 0.3052 34.57677 0.0000
Horse bean 80 1 205.8389 0.4514 65.81973 0.0000
Other food crops 80 4 197.1642 0.6918 181.5386 0.0000
Clothing 80 2 114.5194 0.5064 81.51062 0.0000
Input expenditure 80 2 128.7285 0.5794 113.8921 0.0000
Coefficient Standard error z P >  |z| 95% Confidence interval
Barley
Total expenditure .1079257 .0719653 1.500 0.134 –.0331238 .2489752
Total expenditure2 .000034 9.16 × 10–6 3.717 0.000 .0000161 .000052
No oxen –332.9857 92.70149 –3.592 0.000 –514.6773 –151.2941
One ox –160.5215 63.2709 –2.537 0.011 –284.5302 –36.51283
Intercept 553.0011 130.9527 4.223 0.000 296.3385 809.6637
Wheat
Total expenditure .1358267 .0322582 4.211 0.000 .0726017 .1990516
Total expenditure2 –.0000115 4.10 × 10–6 –2.812 0.005 –.0000196 –3.50 × 10–6
No oxen 181.2548 45.67324 3.969 0.000 91.73689 270.7727
One ox 50.71345 31.21271 1.625 0.104 –10.46234 111.8892
Intercept –203.0583 59.43661 –3.416 0.001 –319.5519 –86.56472
Horse bean
Total expenditure .1342121 .016543 8.113 0.000 .1017885 .1666357
Intercept –102.0223 46.891 –2.176 0.030 193.927 –10.11764
Other food crops
Total expenditure .3413225 .0503891 6.774 0.000 .2425616 .4400833
Total expenditure2 –.000016 6.36 × 10–6 –2.521 0.012 –.0000285 –3.57 × 10–6
No oxen 126.8391 71.71962 1.769 0.077 –13.72878 267.407
One ox 110.5144 48.98375 2.256 0.024 14.50798 206.5208
Intercept –237.3885 93.99712 –2.525 0.012 –421.6194 –53.15749
Clothing
Total expenditure .1448116 .0282768 5.121 0.000 .08939 .2002331
Total expenditure2 –9.12 × 10–6 3.76 × 10–6 –2.423 0.015 –.0000165 –1.74 × 10–6
Intercept –111.0048 44.28079 –2.507 0.012 –197.7936 –24.2161
Input expenditure
Total expenditure .1032091 .0103822 9.941 0.000 .0828604 .1235579
Labor units 7.775533 5.192651 1.497 0.134 –2.401875 17.95294
Intercept 37.41215 30.63557 1.221 0.222 –22.63247 97.45677




he site selected for this study is unique in the African context when it comes to the level
of detail of biophysical and socioeconomic data available over a period of 15–20 years.
The biophysical data include:
 Detailed soil physical and chemical data
 Erosion data at plot level for different conservation technologies and crops over several
years (from researcher- and farmer-managed experiments and farmers’plots)
 Crop yield data on different soils and under different conservation technologies
 Climatic data
 Detailed plot-level data from a stratified random sample of 120 households
Plot-level data were collected by visiting and measuring (by triangulation) and observing all
plots and by interviewing the households owning or renting the plots. Table 4.1 summarizes
the plot-level data by soil/climatic zone and soil depth.
Erosion rates were estimated based on experiments carried out by the Soil Conservation
Research Program (SCRP) over many years in the study site. Yield responses were estimated
based on SCRP experimental data for conservation technology responses, and based on Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) fertilizer experiments and local crop-fertilizer demon-
stration plots managed by the extension system. A more comprehensive analysis of some of
these data is presented in Shiferaw and Holden (2001).
Socioeconomic data were collected in household surveys in 1986, 1994, 1998, and 2000.
These data were used to structure and calibrate the bioeconomic models for the different
household categories (Tables 4.1–4.3). Survey methods and sample sizes changed (improved)
over time, limiting the possibility for panel data analysis. Farm plots were measured (triangu-
lation method) only in the last survey and it was found that measured plot sizes often deviated
considerably from farmers’ own stated farm sizes and official farm sizes used in the land re-
distribution allocation. On average farm plots were found to be almost 30 percent larger than
official plot size but there was a large amount of variation in both directions. The models pre-
sented here were calibrated to measured plot and farm sizes.
Price data were collected in the area during our surveys both at household level and in the
local markets. Prices from 1997 (normal year) and 1999 (drought year) (Table 4.4) were used
to construct expected incomes based on the probability of drought year and expected prices
and expected outputs in drought years and years without drought.
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Holden, Shiferaw, and Pender (2001) found
that plot-level land use depends on oxen
ownership, signifying the imperfections in
land and oxen rental markets. Oxen owner-
ship is also an important determinant of land
rental market participation. Households
without oxen typically rent out part or all of
their land. Households with two oxen or
more are the ones renting in land. House-
holds with one ox typically share oxen with
other one-ox households, as a pair of oxen is
needed for plowing. Shiferaw and Holden
(1998) found, based on econometric analy-
sis of plot-level data collected in 1994, that
poor and land-scarce households were more
likely to dismantle conservation structures
introduced through FFW in the early 1980s.
These findings indicate that bioeconomic
models at watershed and/or community
levels fail to address issues related to social
differentiation when it comes to its impact
on land use. Watershed or community level
bioeconomic models typically rely on perfect
market assumptions and separability of pro-
duction decisions from consumption deci-
sions or on lack of externalities related to
interactions among agents. These assump-
tions do not fit well with the empirical real-
ity in the Ethiopian highlands in general and
the case study area in particular. It appears
more appropriate to model land-use deci-
sions at household group level, and aggre-
gate from household group to the commu-
nity or watershed level afterwards.
Household group modeling and aggre-
gation requires proper weighting and calibra-
tion of the different models to satisfy local
demand and supply equations. It is assumed
that population growth takes place by growth
of average household size for the different
household groups. The share of households
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Table 4.1 Farm areas by zone and slope class in Andit Tid, 2000
Depth class Total area Percentage of
Land type (cm) (measured) (ha) land type area
Dega <30 210 24.9
30–60 432.6 51.3
>60 200.9 23.8
Wurch <30 43.6 17.7
30–60 94.2 38.3
>60 107.8 43.9
All <30 253.6 21.4
30–60 526.8 48.1
>60 308.8 30.5
Table 4.2 Changes in Andit Tid, 1986–99
Variable 1986 1999
Average farm size 3.77 ha 2.16 ha
Average household size 5.04 5.67
Average oxen holding 1.54 1.2
Average number of cows 1.18 0.8
Average number of sheep 6.25 5.3
Cereal production Net sellers Net buyers
Tropical livestock units (TLU)/ha 1.48 1.71in the different household groups may
change over time, however, and this must be
adjusted during aggregation in later years.
Alternatively, farm sizes could have been
adjusted down if fragmentation of land-
holdings through land redistribution con-
tinues. We have calibrated the models to fit
the actual land sizes after the latest land re-
distribution in 1997 in the study area. Farm
sizes are based on actually measured plots.
Measured farm sizes turned out to be on
average as much as 30 percent larger than
stated farm sizes by farmers.
The simulations presented in this report
include only the largest of the household
groups, the one with two or more oxen. This
household group farms about 70 percent of
the land in the area and therefore represents
the principal land managers. The household
group without oxen largely rent out their
land to this household group. Families in the
third household group, those with one ox,
typically depend on cooperation with an-
other household with one ox, in order to pair
their oxen for cultivation. We have therefore
taken the interaction issues between these
household groups as exogenous in our
modeling effort on the dominant household
group. This implies that we have not been
able to capture endogenous village prices
that are exogenous to households. We have
treated such prices as exogenous or in the
land rental market assuming that payment
is a fixed share of output (typical share-
cropping contract) while access to such land
is supply constrained. Holden and Lofgren
(2004) give an example of a model that cap-
tures such interactions among household
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Table 4.3 Basic household and farm characteristics for household groups in 1999, 
used as input in the model
Household group
Variable Two or more oxen One ox No oxen
Household size 6.44 5.81 4.1
Work force 3.53 2.89 2.2
Consumer units 5.15 4.54 3.31
Land owned by land type (ha)
Regosols, slope 0–20%, depth 25 cm 0.79 0.69 0.5
Regosols, slope 0–20%, depth 45 cm 0.41 0.36 0.26
Regosols, slope 0–20%, depth 60 cm 0.15 0.13 0.1
Regosols, slope >20%, depth 25 cm 0.35 0.31 0.22
Andosols, slope 0–20%, depth 25 cm 0.44 0.39 0.28
Andosols, slope 0–20%, depth 45 cm 0.27 0.24 0.17
Andosols, slope 0–20%, depth 60 cm 0.15 0.14 0.1
Andosols, slope >20%, depth 25 cm 0.12 0.1 0.07
Total farm size (ha) 2.68 2.36 1.7
Livestock ownership
Oxen 2 1 0
Cows 1 0.69 0.5
Bulls 0.38 0.34 0.2
Heifers 0.58 0.21 0.1
Sheep, ewes 3.71 2.63 1.07
Sheep, rams 1.63 0.82 0.07
Goats, does 0.77 0.32 0.07
Goats, bucks 0.29 0.13 0
Hens 2 2 2groups endogenously. Such a model re-
quires a village social accounting matrix as
a starting point and it is less detailed when
it comes to agro-ecosystem specifications
and dynamic effects. Shiferaw and Holden
(2004) use another version of the model
presented here and include simulations for
the household group without oxen.
Choice of Time Horizon and
Seasonality in the Model
The simulations presented in this report
include models with 5- and 10-year time
horizons. The time required for each model
to produce a solution increases rapidly as the
time horizon is increased. The probability
that the model does not solve also increases
with the time horizon. This was particularly
the case when we introduced risk in the
model and increased the probability of
drought. It also became harder to make the
models solve for the household groups with
one or no oxen. This is the main reason why
we do not include simulations for those
household groups in this report. The logic
behind these modeling difficulties has to do
with the problem of solving large nonlinear
models that are nonlinear both in the objec-
tive function and in the constraints. At the
same time we try to model households that
live very close to their subsistence level of
income and that are pushed toward even
lower levels of income by population growth
and land degradation. This increases very
much the probability that the models become
infeasible as the number of years for which
the models are solved is increased. A great
deal of time was spent to ensure good start-
ing values for the models, and the specific
choice of utility function (allowing nega-
tive utility and incomes below the poverty
line) helped to reduce the problems faced.
We refer to Holden (2004) for a discus-
sion of alternative bioeconomic modeling
approaches. A good alternative way to the
approach chosen here could be the recur-
sive dynamic modeling approach that Bar-
bier (1996, 1998) and Barbier and Bergeron
(1998, 1999, 2001) have used in Burkina
Faso, Peru, and Honduras. They used a 3- or
5-year planning horizon for each optimiza-
tion but ran the model recursively by
restarting the model using only the first-year
results for each solution. In this way, they
were able to run simulations for much longer
time periods (20–100 years). They were
also able to introduce shocks in the model.
This approach was seriously considered and
even attempted, but found to be very difficult
to implement given the complexity of the
dynamic and other aspects of our model. It
was therefore discarded for practical reasons.
Discounting of utility was captured
through the time-separable utility function.
The discount rate was endogenous in the
model and dependent on household income
per consumer in the household. Discount
rates were estimated by asking households
hypothetical questions to identify their in-
difference points between receiving a fixed
amount in the future and a variable amount
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Table 4.4 Prices of crops and livestock 
in 1997 (normal year) and 1999
(drought year) (Ethiopian birr)
Price Price
Crop or livestock type 1997 1999
Barley, meher (per kg) 1.05 1.65
Barley, belg (per kg) 0.83 1.42
Wheat (per kg) 1.66 2.35
Field pea, meher (per kg) 2.15 2.37
Field pea, belg (per kg) 2.15 2.08
Horse bean (per kg) 1.67 2.38
Lentil, meher (per kg) 2.41 3.66
Lentil, belg (per kg) 2.41 3.75
Linseed (per kg) 1.66 3
Oxen (per head) 966 585
Cows (per head) 558 460
Bulls (per head) 500 293
Heifers (per head) 333 237
Calves (per head) 172 68
Sheep, ewes (per head) 57 41
Sheep, rams (per head) 45 56
Lambs (per head) 33 50
Goats, does (per head) 46 41
Goats, bucks (per head) 48 54
Kids (per head) 33 40
Hens, chicken (per head) 10 7at the present time.28 The discount rates in
the model typically were in the range of
26–28 percent for the two-oxen household
models presented in this report.
Seasonality was captured in the model
by dividing each year into 10 periods. Each
of these periods was one month, except the
period from March to May, which was a
three-month period (slack season). It was
the seasonal variation in labor demand and
labor supply and the consequent seasonal
wage rates that were captured in this way.
Each agricultural production activity had a
specific seasonal labor demand pattern.
The household size and religious holidays
limited the availability of household labor.
Access to off-farm employment (at seasonal
exogenous wages) was constrained in some
model simulations and unconstrained in
other simulations (simulating better market
access). The constraint on such employment
was an overall constraint. Access to food-
for-work (FFW), on the other hand, was
introduced in the slack season (March to
May) only to minimize its competition with
agricultural production activities.
Model Validation
The model is validated by comparison of
base runs with actual survey data for key
output variables for the different household
group categories. Table 4.5 shows the actual
cropping pattern in the 1999 meher season
and the predicted cropping pattern for the
two-oxen household group (range of areas
over 5 years). The year 1999 was a drought
year in which no crops were grown in the
belg season, and this may also have affected
the cropping pattern in the meher  season
(more barley production).
The models are constructed in the Gen-
eral Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS).
A 5-year model contains about 39,600 vari-
ables and 23,300 equations, many of which
are nonlinear.
For an assessment of how the seasonal-
ity and labor allocation in the model works,
an example output for a 5-year model is
provided in Appendix B. It illustrates
clearly that the shadow wage rates vary sys-
tematically across seasons but also change
over time.
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28See Holden, Shiferaw, and Wik (1998) for details about this approach.
Table 4.5 Cropped areas in 1999 and predicted ranges of cropped areas over 
5 years (ha)
Household group
Two-oxen household group model:
(number of oxen owned)
Predicted areas (range over 5 years) 
Credit Credit
Crop 0 1 2 constrained unconstrained
Meher season
Cereals 0.55 0.73 0.96 0.19–0.79 0.25–0.78
Legumes 0.23 0.29 0.32 0.21–0.45 0.23–0.67
Grazing/grass 0.11 0.2 0.22 0.05–0.57 0.00–0.48
Fallow 0.78 0.91 1.12 0.52–0.54 0.35–1.46
Eucalyptus 0.01 0.05 0.08 — —
Degraded 0 0.01 0.03 — —
Belg seasona
Cereals — — — 0.60–0.73 0.62–0.77
Legumes — — — 0.13–0.36 0.13–0.38
a1999 was a year with drought in the belg season; therefore no crops were planted in this season. This may have
caused the shift in barley production to the meher season.CHAPTER 5
Results and Discussion
Land Degradation, Crop Productivity, 
and Impact of Conservation Technologies
T
able 5.1 shows the yield trends over 5 years of barley on regosols (different soil depths
and slopes) with and without conservation technologies when no fertilizer or manure
is applied. Yields are shown for the cases when conservation structures reduce initial
yields and when initial yields are not affected. We see that yields are lowest and decline most
rapidly on shallow soils.
In Table 5.2 the decline in yields of barley over a 5-year period on regosols in the meher
season and on andosols in the belg season, with and without conservation technologies, with-
out and with a fairly high level of fertilizer application, are shown. We see that yields decline
faster on andosols than on regosols, faster on unconserved than on conserved land, faster on
shallow soils and steep slopes, and faster when no fertilizer is used. Yields are declining even
on deeper soils that are conserved and receive a high level of fertilizer (55 kilograms of nitro-
gen and 50 kilograms of phosphorus pentoxide per hectare) because conservation does not
eliminate soil erosion and a marginal reduction in rooting depth reduces yields. The impact of
conservation technologies on yields (without fertilizer use) on different slopes and soil depths
for regosols is presented in Figure 5.1. The impacts of conservation technologies and fertilizer
(separately and in combination) on yield decline on different soil types, slopes, and soil depths
are presented in Figure 5.2.
The Impacts of Drought
The effects of belg season drought on household welfare, income per capita, crop sale, risk
premium, on-farm labor, and credit demand are presented in Table 5.3 for the two-oxen house-
hold group. This group farms 70 percent of the land area and is therefore the dominant land
user group. We therefore chose to focus the modeling on this group.
The effect of providing credit for fertilizer (unconstrained) is compared to the case when
credit access is constrained. The models have been run for 10 and 20 percent risk of drought.
We see that households with unconstrained access to credit to some extent compensate for the
increasing risk of drought by reallocating their production such that crop sales are lower in
good years (no drought) to reduce the need to buy crops (food) in case of drought. With con-
strained access to credit they are less able to do this and they even become net buyers of crops
in good years after a few years owing to land degradation and population growth. Provision
of credit and fertilizer supply may therefore to some extent reduce the need for food aid in
drought years. Credit and fertilizer use helps also to better sustain household welfare while the
23development path is clearly Malthusian with
constrained access to credit for fertilizer
(Table 5.3).
Drought produces both direct and indi-
rect effects. First, there is a direct production
effect as crop production is reduced as a
result of drought. The belg season drought
was so severe in 1999 that no crops could be
produced in this season. This production loss
is therefore equal to the total belg season
crop production in good years. The fact that
the drought strikes over a larger geographical
area leads to indirect price effects. Obviously
crop prices will increase in drought years
and households are typically net buyers of
crops in drought years. This implies that
they have to buy crops at a higher price. In
addition, livestock prices decline when the
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Table 5.1 Barley yields with and without conservation on regosols without 
fertilizer or manure application
Steep slope
Conservation Soil depth Soil depth Soil depth soil depth
Year technology < <30 cm 30–50 cm >50 cm < <30 cm
1 No 300.9 755.8 888.2 289.1
Yes 306.5 759.1 888.8 299.0
Yesa 290.8 721.1 844.3 267.7
2 No 289.1 749.4 887.0 265.3
Yes 300.7 755.0 888.2 285.4
Yesa 284.7 718.2 843.8 254.0
3 No 277.2 742.8 885.7 240.9
Yes 294.8 752.9 887.7 271.6
Yesa 278.8 715.2 843.2 241.6
4 No 265.3 736.3 884.2 216.2
Yes 288.6 749.7 887.1 257.5
Yesa 273.2 712.2 842.7 229.0
5 No 253.2 730.0 882.7 190.9
Yes 282.5 746.6 886.5 243.4
Yesa 267.6 709.2 842.9 216.3
aIf conservation technologies reduce the yields due to their occupation of a part of the area.
Table 5.2 Barley yield declines (kg/ha) in 5 years for different soil types, with and
without conservation technology and with and without fertilizer application
Soil depth Soil depth Soil depth Steep slope, soil
< <30 cm 30–50 cm >50 cm depth <30 cm
Conservation 
Season technology F0a FHa F0 FH F0 FH F0 FH
Meher:
Regosols No 78.3 47.0 57.9 23.5 42.5 4.9 167.0 102.7
Yes 38.5 22.8 27.7 10.8 18.9 1.3 91.0 54.8
Belg:
Andosols No 89.0 60.7 67.9 38.1 51.0 20.6 182.1 126.9
Yes 42.4 28.6 31.9 17.4 23.6 8.8 102.2 70.0
aF0 and FH refer to no fertilizer applied and high level of fertilizer applied (= 55 kg of N/ha and 50 kg of P2O5).drought is severe as people are forced to sell
animals instead of crops or to be able to buy
more food. This leads to a livestock value
loss. We incorporated these losses in the
models with and without unconstrained ac-
cess to credit and with a 10 percent risk of
drought. The results are presented in Table
5.4. We see that the production loss is
higher with unconstrained access to credit
because fertilizer is used on barley in the
belg season in good years (no drought). The
production loss tends to decline over years
owing mainly to crop productivity loss. The
loss resulting from the need to buy cereals
for food in drought years is increasing over
time, however, and is not much different
with or without unconstrained access to
credit for fertilizer. Livestock value losses
decline over time as the number of ani-
mals declines over time. The total loss is
around 80 percent of the poverty line in-
come when credit access is constrained and
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Figure 5.1 Barley yields on regosols (kg/ha) with different soil depth and slope without 
fertilizer or manure application
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Figure 5.2 Barley yield declines over 5 years on andosols and regosols, without and with fertilizer 
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Table 5.3 Two-oxen household group: Impact of belg season drought on household welfare and production,
when credit access for fertilizer is unconstrained or constrained
Expected income Net sale Net sale Drought Total Formal
Risk of per capita crops, no crops, risk on-farm credit
drought Year Utility (Ethiopian birr) drought drought premium labor demand
Unconstrained access to credit for fertilizer
0.1 1 0.439 562 868 –401 0.053 440 272
2 0.495 571 812 –447 0.051 430 364
3 0.517 582 879 –352 0.049 449 446
4 0.486 564 606 –605 0.047 451 446
5 0.445 536 90 –1,111 0.046 434 384
0.2 1 0.265 541 823 –350 0.090 439 273
2 0.328 529 591 –339 0.068 425 236
3 0.352 552 802 –270 0.079 442 377
4 0.323 534 586 –465 0.074 441 415
5 0.298 504 –63 –960 0.062 429 358
Constrained access to credit for fertilizer
0.1 1 0.323 514 494 –337 0.035 439 50
2 0.355 530 164 –623 0.031 465 50
3 0.206 478 –82 –873 0.031 440 50
4 0.274 481 –358 –1,146 0.030 405 50
5 0.182 446 –447 –1,179 0.027 405 50
0.2 1 0.220 510 505 –324 0.064 438 50
2 0.245 513 187 –600 0.057 449 50
3 0.155 487 –43 –831 0.056 454 50
4 0.172 475 –315 –1,090 0.055 396 50
5 0.104 440 –454 –1,065 0.042 410 50even higher when credit for fertilizer is used.
The direct production loss is 30–40 percent
of the total loss without access to credit and
is 40–50 percent of the total loss with un-
constrained access to credit.
Impact of Credit on
Conservation Incentives
The model includes both the options of re-
moval of conservation structures and build-
ing of new conservation structures and there
is a labor requirement for maintaining con-
servation structures. Earlier versions of our
model were used to test how credit access
and fertilizer use affected incentives to con-
serve land (Shiferaw, Holden, and Aune
2001). In Table 5.5 we present new results
on this with the new model in the case when
conservation technologies do not reduce ini-
tial yields. The table shows that the total
erosion (tons of soil per farm) is higher after
provision of credit as the area conserved is
lower, particularly in the initial years. Con-
servation increases substantially over the
years in both the scenarios; however, the
conservation process lags behind in the un-
constrained case as compared to the con-
strained credit access case. Credit access
reduces conservation investment by allowing
farmers to mask the effects of land degrada-
tion in the near term. This may not be a sus-
tainable long-term strategy, however. Some
removal of conservation structures occurs in
the terminal year.
In Table 5.6 we look at the case when
conservation structures reduce initial yields.
Here we look at the impact of credit as well
as the impact of linking access to credit to a
conservation requirement for land where fer-
tilizer is used. We see that erosion rates are
higher when initial yields are reduced by
conservation structures. More labor is used
for removal of conservation structures in the
initial year. Provision of credit does not in-
crease erosion as much in the case when
conservation structures reduce initial yields
because conservation structures are removed
also in the credit constrained case. Imposing
an interlinkage (cross-compliance) policy
that credit for fertilizer only is available for
conserved land, reduces erosion levels by
5–15 percent. The reduction is largest in the
initial years as fewer conservation structures
are removed and more new structures are
built. Household welfare is reduced to some
extent by the interlinkage policy and total
labor requirement is increased in the initial
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Table 5.4 Drought year losses and the effects of credit on drought year losses
Purchase food, Livestock Total loss,
Credit Production lossa price lossb value lossc Total loss as share of
constraint Year (Ethiopian birr) (Ethiopian birr) (Ethiopian birr) (Ethiopian birr) poverty line
Yes 1 834 214 1,013 2,139 0.79
2 781 415 989 2,185 0.79
3 792 471 965 2,228 0.78
4 784 651 932 2,367 0.81
5 829 689 861 2,408 0.81
No 1 1,321 268 1,013 2,679 0.99
2 1,125 313 989 2,427 0.87
3 1,051 412 965 2,429 0.85
4 1,043 552 920 2,524 0.86
5 1,028 632 861 2,558 0.86
aProduction loss is valued at the normal year prices.
bIn drought year, extra cereals have to be bought at a high price.
cLivestock prices are lower in drought year, and this leads to a loss of wealth.years. Although welfare declines under all
the credit scenarios, the decline is much more
pronounced when credit is constrained.
An important policy question is how
easy or difficult is it to implement this type
of interlinkage policy. There are extension
agents staying in Andit Tid and they are
already involved in promoting fertilizer use
through organizing demonstration plots in
farmers’ fields. It is therefore relatively
easy for them to administer such a cross-
compliance requirement. The extension
agent in the area told us that he gave credit
for fertilizer only for use on flat and good
soils. Few households dared to take credit
for fertilizer, however, owing to the risk
involved. This special credit risk aversion
appeared to be due to some bad experiences
in the past when the punishment for failing
to pay back the credit was quite severe.
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Table 5.5 Effects of credit access on conservation investment and soil erosion when
conservation technologies do not reduce initial yields
Total Area Proportion Proportion Proportion
Credit erosion, conserved of all land of regosols of andosols
constraint Year (tons) (ha) conserved conserved conserved
Yes 1 100.3 1.056 0.394 0.437 0.318
2 87.6 1.504 0.561 0.713 0.298
3 78.1 1.852 0.691 0.791 0.518
4 71.2 1.783 0.665 0.713 0.583
5 71.9 1.713 0.639 0.672 0.583
No 1 109.6 0.768 0.287 0.267 0.320
2 103.2 0.845 0.315 0.325 0.298
3 93.8 1.196 0.446 0.532 0.298
4 76.2 1.781 0.664 0.795 0.438
5 73.0 1.667 0.622 0.647 0.580
Table 5.6 Effects of credit access and interlinkage requirements of using credit for fertilizer on conserved land
only when conservation technologies take 5–10 percent of the land out of production
Interlinked Labor for removal Labor for building
Credit credit to Total Total labor of conservation of new conservation
constraint conservation Year Utility erosion (man-days) structures (man-days) structures (man-days)
Yes No 1 0.468 124.3 405 19.5 0.8
2 0.446 121.4 397 0 0.1
3 0.310 113.9 417 0 24.1
4 0.189 100.2 388 0 29.3
5 0.139 84.8 374 0 42.3
No No 1 0.615 125.5 420 19.5 0.8
2 0.647 121.6 409 0 0.1
3 0.593 115.8 420 0 8.7
4 0.533 100.9 412 0 43.9
5 0.352 81.7 411 0 68.9
No Yes 1 0.575 109.2 446 9.9 41.8
2 0.631 109.2 421 2.6 9.6
3 0.580 108.8 415 1.1 14.2
4 0.529 94.8 424 2.4 52.9
5 0.299 75.7 395 3.5 60.5Impact of Improved Access
to Off-Farm Income
Ten-year models were developed to explore
the impact of better access to off-farm in-
come on household welfare, agricultural pro-
duction, conservation incentives, and soil
erosion. The risk of drought in these models
was low (10 percent) and so was the level of
risk aversion.29 Higher risk and risk aversion
caused infeasibilities when the time horizon
was expanded much beyond 5 years. Owing
to population increase, land constraints, and
land degradation, income per capita would
fall by 8 percent over a 5-year period when
there is access to credit and by 16 percent
when there is no access to credit. We did
not manage to make the bioeconomic model
solve for a 10-year period when access to
both wage employment and credit are re-
stricted at very low levels. The income would
be lower than for the case of credit only in
Figure 5.3 and decline over time is likely to
be more rapid than in the case of credit only.
This illustrates the severity of the combined
effects of land degradation, increasing pop-
ulation pressure, stagnant technology, and
drought risk in the case study area. House-
holds are becoming increasingly dependent
on better market access or assistance from
the outside in order to avoid starvation.
We see from Figure 5.3 (containing 10
graphs) that unconstrained access to wage
employment at the going wage rates in Andit
Tid would have substantially improved
household income in the area. The fact that
households have low levels of off-farm in-
come (Table 5.7) indicates that access to
low-wage employment is constrained. This
may be due to imperfect information and
incentive problems. Otherwise, households
in the study area would have worked much
more outside the farm given their small
farms and the risks of agricultural produc-
tion. Provision of better employment oppor-
tunities for unskilled labor (at low wages)
may also substantially improve household
income in the study area.
Figure 5.3 shows that unconstrained ac-
cess to off-farm wage employment substan-
tially improves household cash income and
it also stabilizes income over time compared
to provision of credit only. We will return to
the reason for this later. Unconstrained ac-
cess to off-farm income reduces the demand
for credit for purchase of farm inputs over
time. We see from Figure 5.3 that constrained
access to off-farm wage employment and
land constraints lead to a build-up of un-
utilized household labor (leisure) owing to
limited intensification and extensification
opportunities in farming. This is also be-
cause the work force grows over time as a
result of population growth.
We will now look at how different mar-
ket access conditions affect the agricultural
production over time. Figure 5.3 shows that
households without access to off-farm wage
employment cultivate more of their land,
probably because they have a lower oppor-
tunity cost of labor. Unconstrained access
to credit but not to off-farm employment
creates more incentives for land cultivation
than both having access to credit and off-
farm employment. Agricultural production
is continued on a larger area for a longer pe-
riod of time when households have access
to credit only. The effect on livestock capi-
tal of households under the different market
access conditions is also illustrated in Fig-
ure 5.3. We see that households with access
to credit only build up and hold more live-
stock than households with access to off-
farm employment (with or without credit
constraint). There is a downward trend in
livestock capital over the 10-year period,
however, probably as a result of a decline
in fodder production.
Households with unconstrained access
to credit only remain net sellers of crops in
years with good rains for most of the 10-year
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Credit and off-farmtime period. The surplus declines over time,
however, and turns into a net deficit in the
last year. Households with access to off-
farm income become deficit producers of
food crops also in years with good rainfall
already after 4 years and the deficit grows
to more than 1,000 kilograms of grain per
household by the 10th year. Households with
unconstrained access to both credit and off-
farm wage employment become deficit pro-
ducers already after 5 years. They produce
more food grain in the initial years than
households with unconstrained access to off-
farm wage employment only but they have
a more rapid decline in food grain produc-
tion and have after 10 years a deficit as large
as that of those with unconstrained access to
off-farm income only. Better access to off-
farm income therefore reduces incentives
to produce crops. The pattern is very similar
in drought years, but then all households are
deficit producers. The deficit increases from
about 400 to more than 1,000 kilograms of
grains for households with unconstrained
access to credit only over the 10-year pe-
riod, while it increases from 600 to more
than 1,500 kilograms for households with
access to off-farm wage employment (with
or without access to credit).
Households with unconstrained access to
credit only put much more labor into farm-
ing than households with unconstrained
access to off-farm income. Access to credit
does not help much for the incentives to
work on the farm when there is unconstrained
access to off-farm wage employment. The
supply of labor for off-farm employment in-
creases steadily owing to the growth in the
labor force and the fall in agricultural pro-
ductivity and thus labor input in agriculture.
Households with unconstrained access
to credit only have more incentives to con-
serve their land and conserve much more of
it than households with unconstrained access
to off-farm wage employment. Households
with unconstrained access both to credit and
off-farm wage employment conserve even a
smaller share of their land than households
with unconstrained access to off-farm wage
employment only. Even though households
with off-farm employment cultivate small
land areas (have less intensive agricultural
production), their activity causes more ero-
sion than that of households with access to
credit only because they conserve a much
smaller proportion of their farmland. It ap-
pears therefore that provision of better off-
farm employment opportunities does not
give win–win benefits as the natural resource
base will suffer more because of neglect.
We refer to Holden, Shiferaw, and Pender
(2004) for further analysis and discussions
on the impact of off-farm income on house-
hold welfare and sustainability of land use.
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Table 5.7 Average income by source and household group in Andit Tid, 1999 
(Ethiopian birr)
No-oxen One-ox Two-or-more-oxen
Income source households households households
Wage income 111 63 76
Remittance income 44 12 48
Common property resource income 35 27 37
Business income 73 85 38
Food aid 495 517 565
Farm incomea 394 3,301 55 
Total income 1,153 1,028 1,310
aThis is cash income only. It does not include the value of crops or livestock products that were produced and
consumed by the household during the year. The year (1999) was a drought year, causing total failure of crop pro-
duction during the belg season.Impact of Introducing 
FFW Programs
FFW programs have been widely used to
target food-insecure people and to promote
development in various parts of Ethiopia.
FFW was also used to establish conservation
structures in Andit Tid in the early 1980s.
This was done through a top-down approach
that did not involve local people in planning
or organization. The farm households them-
selves therefore had no say with respect to
choice of conservation technology or how
it fit into the landscape on their farms. This
caused many to reject the technologies, as
many households were found to have partly
or fully removed these technologies on their
farms (Shiferaw and Holden 1998). This
may also have been due to choice of the
wrong type of conservation technology.
We want to assess the impact of new
FFW programs in Andit Tid, aiming at pro-
viding food security through provision of
seasonal employment at a low wage rate (in
food). We look at the impact when employ-
ment is provided outside agriculture and
when employment is provided for conser-
vation investment within agriculture. For
the latter case we assume that the investment
is taking place on the same households’
farms. In both cases the “wage rate” in FFW
is 3 kilograms of wheat per day of work, the
standard rate mostly used in FFW programs
in Ethiopia.
One of the criticisms of FFW is that
FFW will undermine incentives to produce
own food and to take care of own farms,
partly because FFW activities will compete
with farming activities of households. Argu-
ments against this are that if FFW is pro-
vided outside the main agricultural season
such competition may be reduced and FFW
will largely be additional. In Andit Tid there
are two growing seasons. It is most relevant
to provide FFW after the short rains, that is,
in the period March to May. However, FFW
may compete with households’own conser-
vation activities in this period, as these typ-
ically are carried out in the slack season.
In our first simulation we look at impact
of provision of FFW when FFW is not used
for conservation, when households have con-
strained access to the labor market, and land
conservation technologies do not reduce ini-
tial yields. We see from Figure 5.4 that FFW
increases income per capita compared to the
model without access to FFW. We also see
that own food production is reduced in nor-
mal as well as in drought years for house-
holds with access to FFW (excluding the
food obtained through the FFW activity).
We see that farm labor use, including con-
servation labor use, is reduced for house-
holds with access to FFW. This causes a
smaller proportion of the farm to be con-
served and total soil erosion to be larger for
households with access to FFW. Total
leisure time is reduced for households with
access to FFW, indicating that FFW has
substituted not only for farm labor but also
for leisure time. There are therefore clear
costs of providing FFW for poverty reduc-
tion and food security provision in this case,
as it reduces incentives for own food pro-
duction and conservation and increases the
dependency on assistance from outside.
In our second simulation we look at the
impact of FFW when FFW is used for con-
servation on the same households’ farms,
when they have constrained access to the
labor market, and conservation does not re-
duce initial yields. The results are presented
in Figure 5.5. We see from Figure 5.5 that
household income per capita is increased
for households with access to FFW. We also
see that FFW stimulates land conservation
and this leads to less soil erosion. The im-
pact on household food production is small.
In the third simulation we have altered
two of the initial assumptions and look at
the impact of FFW when FFW is used for
conservation, when households have un-
constrained access to the labor market (bet-
ter non-farm employment opportunities),
and conservation technologies reduce initial
yields (lower incentives to conserve land).
The results of the model simulations are
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 3334 CHAPTER 5
Figure 5.4 Impact of introducing food-for-work (FFW) when FFW is not used for conservation, access to the
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Yearincluded in Figure 5.6 Household income
per capita is increased for households with
access to FFW also in this case but less so
than when access to the labor market was
constrained. This implies that the payment
from FFW is higher than in the labor mar-
ket. We also see that FFW substitutes for
other off-farm work in this case.30 On the
other hand, FFW stimulates own food pro-
duction and reduces food deficits in normal
as well as drought years, and particularly so
toward the end of the 10-year period for
which the models have been run. This is
largely because FFW is used for land con-
servation, which makes farm production
more sustainable. Without FFW, households
do not invest in conservation in this case
because conservation reduces initial yields
and because they have alternative off-farm
employment opportunities.
We see that the effects of FFW on food
production and conservation of land can be
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30FFWis available only seasonally and crowds out other off-farm work in this period. Households engage in other
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Figure 5.5 Impact of food-for-work (FFW) when FFW is used for land conservation, access to the labor market is
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With FFWvery different depending on how and for
what activities FFW is used, on the char-
acteristics of the labor market, and on the
impact of conservation technologies on
short-term yields. We also see that the FFW
“wage rate” of 3 kilograms of wheat may be
too high and that better poverty targeting
may be achieved by lowering the rate to 2
or 2.5 kilograms of wheat per day of work.
The food would then probably reach more
needy (more efficient self-selection) and a
larger number of households. FFW may re-
duce incentives to conserve land where such
incentives exist without intervention when
FFW competes with labor used for conser-
vation. On the other hand, FFW may be used
to stimulate conservation when there are in-
sufficient incentives to conserve land. This
illustrates that care has to be taken when
such programs are designed to avoid un-
wanted disincentive effects and to achieve
the objectives of the programs. Good knowl-
edge about the local farming systems, about
the local market characteristics and prices,
and about the distribution of resources and
welfare is needed to avoid design failures.
Those who have designed such programs in
the past have probably not had such knowl-
edge, and this may also explain the mixed
experiences with such programs (Barrett,
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YearHolden, and Clay 2004). We refer to Holden,
Barrett, and Hagos (2005) for further analy-
sis and discussions of FFWas an instrument
to promote sustainable land management.
Impact of Stimulating 
Tree Planting
Planting of trees, especially eucalyptus, may
be a promising option for farm households
in marginal areas of Ethiopia (Jagger and
Pender 2003). In the past, most tree planting
took place on government land and commu-
nity woodlots. However, some tree planting
also took place on privately controlled land.
Jagger and Pender (2003) suggest that tree
planting is most likely to be profitable in
areas with low population density, low agri-
cultural potential, good market access, mar-
ket outlet for tree products, access to long-
term credit, and secure access to the benefits
from the investments. Holden and Yohannes
(2002) found that resource poverty may
undermine planting of perennials in south-
ern Ethiopia. If farm households adopt short
planning horizons owing to poverty and
tenure insecurity, they may not adopt tree
planting as it may take 8–15 years before
they can harvest the benefits of their in-
vestments. It may under such conditions be
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Yearsocially optimal to intervene to stimulate
private tree planting as the benefits from
intervention may be higher than the costs.
Interventions may take alternative forms
depending on local circumstances and vari-
ous approaches should be tested. Direct
regulation is one alternative, as has been
recently done in Tigray, where planting of
eucalyptus on land suitable for crop pro-
duction was prohibited in 1997 (Jagger and
Pender 2003). Beginning in the late 1990s,
the regional government allowed private
planting of eucalyptus on community waste-
land and steep hillsides. In the Amhara
Region distribution of communal lands on
long-term lease contracts for private tree
planting has also started.
Our case study area has high population
density, no access to long-term credit, and
farmers may not feel secure that they will be
getting the benefits from their tree planting
efforts (Holden and Shiferaw 2000). The
land redistribution in 1997 may have under-
mined the feeling of tenure security and re-
duced the incentives to plant trees. Poverty,
credit constraints, and lack of access to tree
seedlings may be other reasons for under-
investment in tree planting compared to
what would be socially optimal. Our survey
showed that farm households in the area are
not willing to plant trees on land suitable for
crop production but are positive toward tree
planting on land unsuitable for cropping. The
potential of this option to improve house-
hold welfare is therefore what we will ex-
plore with our bioeconomic model. We also
want to explore the indirect effects on agri-
cultural production and incentives for con-
servation, considering the income effects
and possible competition among alternative
uses of family time for agricultural produc-
tion, conservation, tree production, non-farm
employment, and leisure. We do not here
explore alternative ways of promoting tree
planting but rather assume that the con-
straints to tree planting have been removed
and that a stable tree rotation has been es-
tablished, given that it is profitable. We
therefore try to assess the potential contri-
bution of trees to household income and the
impact such production may have on other
production and conservation activities.
We allow tree planting only on steep
slopes and shallow soils unsuitable for crop
production. Almost all land in densely pop-
ulated Andit Tid has been distributed to
individual households. The average area of
steep and shallow soils is 0.45 hectares per
household. The average area planted with
trees on the farms was only 0.09 hectares
per household. It should therefore be pos-
sible to increase the area planted with trees
from 3.3 percent to 18.2 percent of the av-
erage farm size without using land that is
suitable for crop production.
The high elevation in Andit Tid causes
the time from planting to harvesting of eu-
calyptus to be as long as 12 years. The
average price of harvested trees was 12 birr
in 1998. This is substantially below the
lowest price of 17 birr used by Jagger and
Pender in their study in Tigray. This was
the case even though Andit Tid is located
along the main road between Addis Ababa
and the Tigray Region. We also assume away
marketing constraints in our analysis and
assume that farm households may sell all
the trees they produce at the 1998 price.
However, we included a small transporta-
tion cost for trees of 0.5 birr per tree. We
used a planting density of 5,000 trees/
hectare and a survival rate of 60 percent.
We have not included additional ecological
benefits and costs (externalities) of eucalyp-
tus planting in the model as these are highly
uncertain and complex and it is not clear
whether the net effects are positive or nega-
tive (Jagger and Pender 2003).31 Such ef-
fects could be included, however, if they
were quantified.
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31In a recent extension of the model, benefits of carbon sequestration effects of tree planting (and other land-use
decisions) have been included by adding a carbon stock to the model (Angelsen et al. 2003).RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 41
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Figure 5.7 illustrates the potential im-
pact of planting of a stable rotation of eu-
calyptus trees on land unsuitable for crop
production in Andit Tid.32 We have in this
case assumed that households have un-
constrained access to off-farm employment.
We see that planting of eucalyptus on land
unsuitable for crop production can increase
household income substantially. This is in
line with what has been found also in other
studies. We see that land for crop produc-
tion is not used for tree planting and did not
reduce incentives to grow food. Larger food
deficits are due to higher demand for food
as a consequence of the higher income from
the sale of trees. Planting of trees had little
impact on incentives for conservation of
land used for crop production and therefore
also had little impact on total soil erosion
on farms. Growing of trees reduces the de-
mand for off-farm employment because the
return to tree growing is much higher than
the wages in the labor market for unskilled
labor.
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YearIt appears that stimulation of planting of
eucalyptus may be a promising policy op-
tion for degraded drought-prone areas in the
Ethiopian highlands provided that market
outlets can be identified/developed. Inter-
ventions may be necessary to promote this
through stimulation of seedling production,
mobilization of labor, and identification of
suitable areas for planting.
Finally, we looked at the combined ef-
fects of FFW employment to promote land
conservation and planting of eucalyptus, in
the case with unconstrained access to off-
farm employment, and when conservation
investment reduces initial yields. The re-
sults are presented in Figure 5.6.
The impact of FFW on income is small
compared to the planting of trees. FFW stim-
ulates land conservation and reduces soil
erosion, however, also when tree planting
is included. The combination of tree plant-
ing and FFW for conservation therefore
appears to produce superior outcomes and
substantial increases in household income
are achieved while conservation of cropped
land is also achieved. We have not, how-
ever, taken into account the administrative
costs of stimulating tree planting and using
FFW. That has to be done to make a social
cost–benefit analysis of the alternative poli-
cies. For further assessment of promotion of
tree planting as a strategy to reduce poverty
in the Ethiopian highlands we refer to
Holden, Shiferaw, and Pender (2004).
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Conclusions
W
e have developed bioeconomic models for a severely degraded area with high pop-
ulation density and good market access in the Ethiopian highlands. The area has
recently been severely affected by droughts in the belg season. We have devel-
oped models to assess the impacts of the drought on household production and welfare. We
use the models to assess both the direct production losses and the indirect losses due to price
changes for crops and livestock. Households will need to buy cereals at a high price in drought
years to meet their food needs and/or depend on food aid. Land degradation and population
growth have increased the need to purchase food over time and the area has changed from
being a surplus producer to a net buyer of cereals. Furthermore, severe drought causes live-
stock prices to decline. As livestock is the most important form of household wealth, this in-
direct effect of the drought is considerable.
We found that provision of credit for fertilizer may increase barley production consider-
ably and make more households surplus producers of grains, at least in years when drought
does not occur. As much of the barley is produced in the drought-prone belg season, provision
of credit for fertilizer does not reduce much the need to purchase cereals in drought years.
Higher production in good years may, however, make households more able to cope with the
drought year losses. The decline in household welfare over time may also be reduced by pro-
vision of credit for fertilizer.
Provision of credit for fertilizer has a negative effect on incentives to conserve land and
this causes erosion rates to be higher when credit is provided. In the case when conservation
structures reduce initial yields it may be useful to interlink provision of credit for fertilizer to
a conservation requirement, as this may create additional incentives to conserve land and re-
duce erosion rates.
Overall, even the combination of conservation structures and high levels of fertilizer use
cannot sustain crop yields as erosion cannot be eliminated and soils in the area are shallow.
Technical change, off-farm income, population control, or outmigration are necessary to avoid
starvation or chronic dependence on food aid.
We find that better access to off-farm income reduces farm households’incentives to invest
in conservation and that this leads to more overall soil erosion and more rapid land degrada-
tion. This is the case even though total agricultural production (crop and livestock production)
and farm input use are reduced when access to off-farm employment is improved. The simu-
lations also indicate that there are entry barriers in wage-employment. Better (unlimited) ac-
cess to off-farm income at the low seasonal wage rates that are typical in the study area had a
considerable positive impact on household welfare but increased the need to import basic food
grains to the area. There is therefore a need to complement a policy focusing on the development
of the non-farm sector with a policy that ensures conservation of the natural resource base.
44We find that food-for-work (FFW) pro-
grams may be used to improve household
food security and to promote more sustain-
able land management. There is a danger
that such programs may undermine private
incentives for food production and land con-
servation. By linking FFW to conservation
investments, negative side effects may be
minimized. However, local participation and
commitment is important to ensure lasting
effects of the investments.
Stimulation of planting of eucalyptus is
a promising policy alternative. If land un-
suitable for crop production is planted with
eucalyptus and market outlets for the trees
can be found, this can provide substantial
increases in household incomes. This may
not have large effects on incentives to con-
serve cropland.
FFW may be used to stimulate tree plant-
ing as well as cropland conservation. Policies
combining promotion of tree planting and
conservation through FFW may have the po-
tential to achieve win–win benefits in terms
of poverty reduction and more sustainable
land use. Careful design and implementa-
tion is required to maximize such benefits.
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A Dynamic Non-Separable Farm Household
Model for Andit Tid, Ethiopia
D
etailed lists of sets, parameters, scalars, variables, and equations in the model are pre-
sented in this appendix.
Sets
A Animal production activities
BTYPE Type of credit
C Crop production activities
CA(A) Animal slaughter activities
CC(C) Consumption activities for crop products
CR(C) Consumption of cereals
CTCH(TECHL) Conservation technology
E(A) Existing seed animals
FERT Type of fertilizer
FERTL Levels of fertilizer
LAND Land-use category
NCTCH(TECHL) Traditional technology
NP Soil nutrients nitrogen and phosphorus
NUT Nutrients for human consumption
PA(A) Animal purchase activities
PAP Purchased consumption commodities of animal origin
PL(C) Consumption of pulses
PULSE(C) Pulse crops
R(A) Livestock rearing activities
RAMBK(A) Rams and bucks
S Season for labor use
SA(A) Animal sale activities








TABLE ANPRICE(PAP,*) Prices of purchased animal products
TABLE CALNUT(NUT,*) Calorie composition of nutrients
(kcal/kg)
TABLE CLOCUP(C,LAND,TECHL,FERTL,S) Months of land occupation by crops 
(ha)
TABLE CONSERL(LAND,*) Labor demand for conservation and 
other land-specific parameters
TABLE CPRICES(C,*) Prices of purchased crops and nutrient 
composition
TABLE CREDINT(BTYPE,*) Interest rate on credit
TABLE CRESNPC(C,NP) Nutrient composition of crop residues 
(kg/ton)
TABLE CROPNPC(C,*) Nutrient composition of grains 
(kg/ton harvested)
TABLE CROPYL(LAND,TECHL,C) Crop yields (kg/ha) without fertilizer
TABLE DRYMREQ(A,*) Livestock dry matter requirements 
(tons/year)
TABLE EGGNCOM(*,*) Nutrient composition of farm-
produced eggs
TABLE FERESPN(C,LAND,*) Marginal responses to nitrogen fertil-
izer for crops (kg/ha)
TABLE FERESPP(C,LAND,*) Marginal responses to phosphorus fer-
tilizer for crops (kg/ha)
TABLE FERPRICE(FERT,*) Prices of fertilizer inputs
TABLE FERTNUT(FERT,NP) Fertilizer nutrients in proportion
TABLE FERTZ(NP,FERTL) Fertilizer use levels for crops (kg/ha)
TABLE HBLABS(S,*) Human labor supply in each season in 
days
TABLE LABORUSE(C,LAND,TECHL,FERTL,S) Human labor use on crops
TABLE LVLABREQ(*,S) Labor requirements for livestock 
(herded)
TABLE LVPRICE(A,*) Prices of livestock and nutrient com
position
TABLE MANNUT(NP,*) Manure nutrients in proportion
TABLE MISC(C,LAND,TECHL,FERTL,*) Seed used soil loss input cost yield of 
crops
TABLE NDEMPL(NP,*) Nitrogen demand for pulses
TABLE NUTCRQC(C,*) Household nutrient requirements from 
cereals
TABLE NUTPRQM(*,*) Household nutrient requirements from 
meat
TABLE NUTPRQP(C,*) Household nutrient requirements from 
pulses
TABLE OXENLABU(C,LAND,TECHL,FERTL,S) Oxen labor use on crops
TABLE PERCONC(NUT,*) Calorie consumption from nutrients 
(percent)
TABLE PLANTLAB(S,*) Labor requirements (workdays/ha) for 
planting trees
A DYNAMIC NON-SEPARABLE FARM HOUSEHOLD MODEL 47TABLE TREEOCUP(LAND,S) Months of land occupation by euca-
lyptus trees (ha)
TABLE WAGERATE(S,*) Wage rates
TABLE YDEPTH(C,TECHL,LAND,*) The intercept terms for crops in rela-
tion to soil depth
Scalars
AEMU Absolute value of elasticity of marginal utility
ALFA(T) Initial cash
AREA(LAND) Available own land in hectares 1999 (ha)
CARBRQY(T) Annual carbohydrate requirements (kg)
CONSTPV Constant term for the PV function
CRESDP Crop residue price (per ton)
CWRATIO(T) Consumer worker ratio in period T
DM Dry matter content of crop residue
FATREQY(T) Annual fat requirements (kg)
GR1DUM Dummy variable equation (1) for low-income group
GRCULU(T) Growth rate of family size
INPUTSHARE Share of cash farm income used for input purchase next season
ISTOCKAV(LAND,NP) Initial stock of N and P available
ISTOCKNP(LAND,NP) Initial stock of N and P in the soil (tons/ha)
KCALPYR Kilocalories per CU per year
LIVN(A) Number of existing livestock on farm (number)
MANPYPA(A) Collectable dry manure produced (kg) per year per animal
MANURL Labor needed to distribute a ton of manure
MUD Downside risk aversion
NCONS Number of consumers in the family
NDEP(T,LAND) Nitrogen deposition
NFAM Number of family members
NUTRQY(T,NUT) Annual nutrient requirements (kg)
NWORK Number of workers in the family
OXHIREP Price of hiring in oxen pairs per day
PDEP(T,LAND) Phosphorus deposition
PEXP(C) Expected price for crops
PEXPA(A) Expected price for livestock
POVLINE(T) Poverty line in birr per household per year
PROTREQY(T) Annual protein requirements (kg)
PROTRQ Protein requirement per CU in kg/year
RISKBELG Drought risk in belg season
RISKPROB Risk probability credit for fertilizer
SUBLEIS(T) Minimum annual leisure consumption and household chores 
SUBLEISS(T,S) Minimum seasonal leisure consumption and household chores
SUBLEISV(T) Value of minimum annual leisure consumption and household 
chores
SUBWAGE(T) Subsistence wage rate
TCONS(T) Total number of consumer units in each period
TFLABS(T,S) Total family labor available in each season
TFLABY(T) Total family labor available in each year
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TREECOST Transport cost per unit of trees harvested
TREEPR Price per unit of mature eucalyptus
TREEVAL(LAND) The value of trees harvested per hectare of land
TWORK(T) Total number of workers in each period
Variables
Utility and Income Variables
AVGSHVLB(S) Average shadow value of labor in each season
AVGSHVLD(LAND) Average shadow value of land
AVGSHVOX(S) Average shadow value of oxen labor in each season
AVGSHVSE(LAND) Average shadow value of soil on conserved land
AVGSVCAP Average shadow value of capital
AVGSVFED Average shadow value of animal feed
AVGSVNUT(NUT) Average shadow value of subsistence food
AVGSVXCR(C) Average shadow value of crop production
AVGVENCO(LAND) Average shadow value of soil on non-conserved land
BELGRISK(T) Expected loss due to drought risk in belg season
BELGRISK(T) Loss due to increased drought risk in belg season
BELGRISKN(T) Normalized risk loss in belg season
BUYFOOD(T) Expenditures for buying food in bad year
BYLOSS(T) Total loss in bad year in crop and animal production
BYLOSSN(T) Normalized bad-year loss
CASHEXP(T) Cash expenditure
CASHINC(T) Cash income
CEINC(T) Certainty equivalent income
CREDIT(T,BTYPE) Amount borrowed from formal and informal sources (birr)
CRSALLO(T) Loss of crop sale in bad year
DF(T) Cumulative discount factor in period T
DF1(T) Discount factor in period T
DISCY Discounted household income (objective function)
DOWNRISKV(T) Downside risk variance in relation to credit
DRATE(T) Discount rate in period T
GCROPPVB(T) Gross crop production value belg crops
GCROPPVM(T) Gross crop production value meher crops
GROSCROPB(T,C) Gross production of belg crops
GROSCROPM(T,C) Gross production of meher crops
HHINCOME(T) Household full income (with leisure)
HHINCOMEN(T) Normalized household full income and the value of normalized 
leisure
HHINCOMS(T) Normalized household income (household income divided by 
poverty line income)
HHUTIL(T) Household utility in period T
HHUTILB(T) Household utility if year T is bad
HHUTILG(T) Household utility if year T is good
HHUTILM(T) Expected household utility in period T
INTERM(T) Intermediate product in risk premium calculation
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LVSTSALBY(T) Livestock sale value in bad year
LVSTSALE(T) Livestock sale value in good year
LVSTSALO(T) Loss in livestock income due to price decline in bad year
LVSTVALO(T) Livestock value loss in bad year
LVSTVBY(T) Livestock value in bad year
NCROPPVB(T) Net crop production value belg crops
NCROPPVM(T) Net crop production value meher crops
NETCASH(T) Net cash
NETCROPB(T,C) Net production of belg crops
NETCROPM(T,C) Net production of meher crops
NHHY(T) Household income
NHHY2(T) Household income per consumer unit
NHHYBY(T) Household income in bad year
NHHYN(T) Normalized household income
NSALCRBY(T) Net crop sale value in bad year—negative if net buyer
NSALEBCR(T) Net sale value of belg crops
NSALECR(T) Net sale value of all crops
NSALEMCR(T) Net sale value of meher crops
PV(T) Present value equivalent in period T
RISKP(T) Risk premium on credit
RISKP2(T) Risk premium due to belg season drought risk
SCALEIS(T) Normalized household leisure (value of household leisure divided 
by subleisure)
SHAREP(T) Share rent paid for rented-in land
VALCSALE(T) Total value of crop sales including stored and sold
VALIVSAL(T) Total value of livestock sales
VALLANRE(T) Total income from renting out land
VARHHINC(T) Variance of household normalized income due to belg drought risk
VLEISURE(T) The value of leisure
Crop Production and Land Management
ACULT(T,LAND) Total area cultivated by land type (ha)
AVCAWCON(LAND) Average area cultivated without conservation
BARCONEX(T) Consumption expenditure on barley
CARECON(T,LAND) Cumulative land area treated with conservation 
(ha)
CARENCON(T,LAND) Cumulative land area without conservation (ha)
CEREALAR(T) Cereal area (ha)
CONSREM(T,LAND) Conservation area removed in each year (ha)
CUMACONS(LAND) Cumulative area conserved (ha)
CUMAREM(T,LAND) Cumulative conservation area removed up to 
period T (ha)
DEPTHCON(T,LAND) Soil depth (cm) in each period with conservation
DEPTHNCO(T,LAND) Soil depth (cm) in each period without conservation
FALCON(T) Own fallow land conserved
FALLOW(T,LAND,TECHL) Land fallowed (ha)
GRAZCON(T) Own grazing land conserved
GRAZEL(T,LAND,TECHL) Land reserved for grazing purposes (ha)
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GROSCROP(T,C) Gross crop production
GYIELD(T,C,LAND,TECHL,FERTL) Net grain yield after erosion
HIREIAND(T) Total area of andosols rented in (ha)
HIREIREG(T) Total area of regosols rented in (ha)
HIRINL(T,LAND) Land rented in by land type (ha)
IAREACON(T,LAND) Land area remaining under conservation from land 
conserved before year 1
INAREACON(T) Earlier conserved area remaining conserved
INTERCEP(T,C,TECHL,LAND) The intercept term in the yield soil depth function
NAREACON(T) New area conserved
NCONSL(T,LAND) Total non-conserved land (ha)
NETCRBY(T,C) Net crop production in bad year
NETCROP(T,C) Net crop production
OWNCNCON(T,LAND) Land cropped without conservation each year 
(only own land)
OWNCNCON(T,LAND) Own land area cropped without conservation in 
each year
OWNUNCON(T) Own area unconserved (ha)
PARECON(T,LAND) Incremental land area treated in each year (ha)
PRCONALL(T) Proportion of all land conserved
PRCONAND(T) Proportion of andosols conserved
PRCONDEE(T) Proportion of deep soils conserved
PRCONLST(T) Proportion of less steep land conserved
PRCONREG(T) Proportion of regosols conserved
PRCONSHA(T) Proportion of shallow soils conserved
PRCONVST(T) Proportion of very steep land conserved
PRODLBY(T,C) Production loss in bad year
PROPCON(T,LAND) Proportion of total land area conserved (new and 
old)
PROPFGR(T,LAND) Proportion of total land area fallowed or used for 
grazing
PROPRENT(T,LAND) Proportion of total land area rented out
PULSEA(T) Total area of pulse crops (ha)
RENTEDNC(T,LAND) Land rented in and cropped without conservation 
each year (only own land)
RENTOUT(T,LAND) Land rented out
RENTUTL(T) Total area of land rented out (ha)
SHARECBY(T,C) Share crop payment in bad year
SHARECR(T,C) Share crop payment to owner in kilograms of crop
TACULT(T) Total area cultivated (ha)
TCROPA(C,T) Total cropped area of each crop (ha)
TLCWCON(LAND) Sum of area cultivated without conservation
TOTACONS(T,LAND) Total area cultivated with conservation (old plus 
new conservation)
TOTCON(T) Total own land conserved
TREEHARV(T) Total area of trees harvested (new plus regrowth of 
trees)(ha)
XBUYCON(T,C) Amount of purchased crop consumption (kg)
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XBUYSED(T,C) Amount of crop purchased for seed stock (kg)
XCONS(T,C) On-farm consumption of crop products (kg)
XCONSBY(T,C) Consumption of own produce in bad year
XCRESID(T) Amount of crop residue bought (tons)
XCROP(T,C,LAND,FERTL,TECHL) Crop production activities (ha)
XSEED(T,C) Amount of own crop used as seed stock (kg)
XSELCRBY(T,C) Net sale of crops in bad year
XSELCROP(T,C) Amount of crop production sold (kg)
XSTORBY(T,C) Stored crop in bad year
XSTORED(T,C) Crop stored for next year (kg)
XSTOREDC(T,C) Crop stored in period T for consumption the fol-
lowing year (kg)
XSTOREDS(T,C) Crop stored in period T for sale the following year 
(kg)
XTCONS(T,C) Total consumption of food crops (kg)
XTCONSBY(T,C) Total consumption in bad year
XTSELL(T,C) Total annual sale (including stored) of crop products
YIELDC(C,LAND,TECHL,FERTL) Difference in yields first and last year
Soil Erosion, Fertilizer Use, Nutrient Depletion
ANAPP(T,NP,LAND) Average N applied (kg/ha)
APAPP(T,NP,LAND) Average P applied (kg/ha)
AVEFALL(T,LAND) Average soil erosion on non-cultivated land (tons/ha)
AVENCONL(T,LAND) Average soil erosion on non-conserved cultivated 
land (tons/ha)
AVGCECON(T,LAND) Average cumulative soil erosion on conserved culti-
vated land (tons/ha)
AVGCENON(T,LAND) Average cumulative soil erosion on non-conserved 
cultivated land (tons/ha)
AVGECONL(T,LAND) Average soil erosion on conserved cultivated land 
(tons/ha)
AVGECONL(T,LAND) Average soil erosion on own conserved cultivated 
land (tons/ha)
AVGENCON(T,LAND) Average soil erosion on own non-conserved culti-
vated land (tons/ha)
AVGEOWCL(T,LAND) Average soil erosion on own cultivated land (tons/ha)
AVGSER(T,LAND) Average soil erosion on cultivated land (tons/ha)
AVGSERT(T,LAND) Average soil erosion on all land by land type 
(tons/ha)
CDEPTHCO(LAND) Change in soil depth on conserved land
CDEPTNCO(LAND) Change in soil depth on non-conserved land
CNPCH(T,TECHL,NP,LAND) Change in the cumulative available N and P from 
year to year (kg/ha)
CNPSTOCK(T,TECHL,NP,LAND) Stock of N and P net of erosion and annual losses 
(tons/ha)
CTSOILER(T,LAND) Cumulative soil eroded up to the period (tons)
CUSENCON(T,LAND) Cumulative soil eroded on non-conserved land up to 
the period (tons)
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period (tons)
CUSERFAL(T,LAND) Cumulative soil eroded on fallow and grazing land up 
to the period (tons)
EROSFAL(T,LAND) Erosion on fallow grazing and plantation land
FERTBUY(T,FERT) Fertilizer bought by type (kg)
FERTNP(T,NP,LAND) N and P applied through fertilizer (kg)
NPAVAIL(T,TECHL,NP,LAND) Change in the available N and P from year to year 
(kg/ha)
NPSTOCKC(T,TECHL,NP,LAND) Stock of N and P in the soil net of erosion losses 
(tons/ha)
TNPSTOCK(T,NP,LAND) Level of N and P (kg) for each land type
TSERCON(T,LAND) Amount of soil eroded on conserved land (tons)
TSEROS(T) Total soil erosion
TSEROSNC(T,LAND) Amount of soil eroded on non-conserved land (tons)
TSOILER(T,LAND) Amount of soil eroded in each period (tons)
Family and Oxen Time Use
CROPLABS(T,S) Total crop labor by season
DRUD1(T,S) Seasonal extra drudgery linear
DRUD2(T,S) Seasonal extra drudgery quadratic
FLABOFM(T,S) Family labor used in off-farm in each season (man-days)
FLABONF(T,S) Family labor used on-farm in each season (man-days)
FLABOXH(T,S) Family labor used for hiring in oxen in each season (man-days)
FLEISURE(T,S) Family leisure time in each season (man-days)
HIREDL(T,S) Hired labor in each season (man-days)
LABCON(T,S) Labor used for conservation in each season (man-days)
LABDEM(T) Total labor used (family and hired labor)
LABFARM(T) Total labor used in production (man-days)
LABHAR(T,S) Labor used for harvesting trees in each season (man-days)
LABMAN(T,S) Labor used for manure distribution in each season (man-days)
LABRCON(T,S) Labor used for removal of conservation in each season (man-days)
LVSTLABS(T,S) Livestock labor by season
ONFLABS(T,S) On-farm labor by season
OXCAPS(T,S) Seasonal oxen labor capacity
OXLABCRS(T,C,S) Seasonal oxen labor requirement by crop
OXLABS(T,S) Seasonal oxen labor use
OXLEIS(T,S) Seasonal oxen leisure
PLANTL(T,S) Labor used for planting trees in each season (man-days)
SVALUELS(T,S) Shadow value of leisure (birr per man-day)
TFLAB(T,S) Total seasonal family labor use
TFLABHOX(T) Total family labor used for hiring in oxen (man-days)
TFLABOFF(T) Total family labor used off-farm (man-days)
TFLABON(T) Total family labor used on-farm (man-days)
THIREDL(T) Total hired labor time (man-days)
TLABCONS(T) Total labor used in conservation (man-days)
TLABHART(T) Total labor used for harvesting trees (man-days)
TLABMAN(T) Total labor used for distributing manure (man-days)
TLABRCON(T) Total labor used for removal of conservation (man-days)
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TPLANTL(T) Total labor used for planting trees (man-days)
XCROPLABS(T,C,S) Seasonal labor required by crop
Livestock Activities
BUYANIP(T,PAP) Buy animal products (kg)
CONSBAN(T,A) Purchased animal slaughtering activities (heads)
CONSOWNA(T,A) Own animal slaughtering activities (heads)
DMANURE(T) Total manure (kg dry matter) production per year
EGGSOWN(T) Consumption of own eggs
LIVBIN(T) Value 1(0) for livestock production
LIVBUY(T,A) Livestock buying activities (heads)
LIVPROD(T,A) Livestock production activities (heads)
LIVREAR(T,A) Newborn rearing activities (heads)
LIVSALE(T,A) Livestock selling activities (heads)
LVSTOCKVAL(T) Total value of animal stock in each period
MANUSE(T) Amount (kg) of animal manure applied on the fields
OXHIREIN(T,S) Oxen pairs hired in for labor
Consumption Requirements
FATCAL(T) Total kilocalories from fat
PRCARCAL(T) Total kilocalories from protein and carbohydrates
PROTCAL(T) Total kilocalories from protein
TOTCAL(T) Total kilocalories
TOTCONS(T) Total kilocalories consumed per consumer unit
Equations
Objective: Discounted Utility
OBJEQ DISCY = SUM(T,HHUTIL(T)*DF(T))
Endogenous Discount Factor and Discount Rates
DFEQ(T) DF1(T) = 1/(1 + DRATE(T))
DFEQ1(T)$(ORD(T) EQ 1) DF(T)$(ORD(T) EQ 1) = DF1(T)$(ORD(T) EQ 1)
DFEQ2(T) DF(T + 1) = DF(T)*DF1(T + 1)
DRATEQ(T) DRATE(T) = 100/PV(T) – 1
PVEQ(T) PV(T) = CONSTPV + 0.0046*NHHY2(T) 
– 6.58*GR1DUM
Household Normalized Income plus Leisure in Each Period
HINCOMY(T) NHHY(T) = HHINCOME(T) – VLEISURE(T)
NHHYNEQ(T) NHHYN(T) = NHHY(T)/POVLINE(T)
HINCBYEQ(T) NHHYBY(T) = NHHY(T) 
– BELGRISK(T)*(1 – RISKBELG)/RISKBELG
HINCOMY2(T) NHHY2(T) = NHHY(T)/TCONS(T)
HHNINCEQ(T) HHINCOMEN(T) = HHINCOME(T)/(POVLINE(T) 
+ SUBLEISV(T))
DOWNRISKEQ(T) DOWNRISKV(T) = 0.7*RISKPROB*(CREDIT(T,‘GC’)
*(1 + CREDINT(‘GC’,‘IRATE’))**2)
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(NHHY(T)*POVLINE(T))
HHUTILEQ(T) HHUTIL(T) = (1 – AEMU)/(CEINC(T))**(AEMU – 1) 
+ (AEMU – 1)
HHUTILBEQ(T) HHUTILB(T) = (1 – AEMU)/(HHINCOMEN(T) 
– RISKP(T) – BELGRISKN(T)*(1 – RISKBELG)/
RISKBELG)**(AEMU – 1) + (AEMU – 1)
HHUTILGEQ(T) HHUTILG(T) = (1 – AEMU)/(HHINCOMEN(T) 
– RISKP(T) + BELGRISKN(T))**(AEMU – 1) 
+ (AEMU – 1)
HHUTILMEQ(T) HHUTILM(T) = RISKBELG*HHUTILB(T) 
+ (1 – RISKBELG)*HHUTILG(T)
BELGRNEQ(T) BELGRISKN(T) = BELGRISK(T)/HHINCOME(T)
VARHHINCEQ(T) VARHHINC(T) = (BELGRISK(T))**2*(1 – RISKBELG) 
+ BELGRISK(T)*(1 – RISKBELG))**2
RISKP2EQ(T) RISKP2(T) = 0.5*AEMU*(VARHHINC(T)**0.5/
HHINCOME(T))**2*HHINCOMEN(T)
CEINCEQ(T) CEINC(T) = HHINCOMEN(T) – RISKP(T) – RISKP2(T)
ELEISUR1(T) VLEISURE(T) = SUM(S,FLEISURE(T,S)
*SVALUELS(T,S))SUM(S,SUBLEISS(T,S))*SUBWAGE(T)
ELEISUR(T) SCALEIS(T) = VLEISURE(T)/SUBLEISV(T)
Share Rent Payment for Rented in Land










New Risk in Belg Season Crop Production Due to Drought





GCROPPVMEQ(T) GCROPPVM(T) = SUM(C,NETCROPM(T,C)*PEXP(C))
GCROPPVBEQ(T) GCROPPVB(T) = SUM(C,NETCROPB(T,C)*PEXP(C))
NCROPPVMEQ(T) NCROPPVM(T) = GCROPPVM(T) 
– SUM(C,XBUYSED(T,C)$MEHERC(C)*PEXP(C))
NCROPPVBEQ(T) NCROPPVB(T) = GCROPPVB(T) 
– SUM(C,XBUYSED(T,C)$BELGC(C)*PEXP(C))
NSALEMCREQ(T) NSALEMCR(T) = NCROPPVM(T) 
– SUM(C,XTCONS(T,C)$MEHERC(C)*PEXP(C))
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– SUM(C,XTCONS(T,C)$BELGC(C)*PEXP(C))
NSALECREQ(T) NSALECR(T) = NSALEMCR(T) + NSALEBCR(T)
NSALCRBYEQ(T) NSALCRBY(T) = NSALECR(T) – NCROPPVB(T)
Bad Year Losses
CRSALLOEQ(T) CRSALLO(T) = NSALECR(T) – NSALCRBY(T)
BUYFOODEQ(T) BUYFOOD(T) = – NSALCRBY(T)*0.579
LVSTSALEEQ(T) LVSTSALE(T) = SUM(A,LIVSALE(T,A)$SA(A)
*LVPRICE(A,‘PPRICE’)$SA(A))
LVSALBYEQ(T) LVSTSALBY(T) = SUM(A,LIVSALE(T,A)$SA(A)
*LVPRICE(A,‘PRICEBY’)$SA(A))
LVSTSALOEQ(T) LVSTSALO(T) = LVSTSALE(T) – LVSTSALBY(T)
LVSTVBYEQ(T) LVSTVBY(T) = SUM(A,LIVPROD(T,A)$E(A)
*LVPRICE(A,‘PRICEBY’)$E(A)) 
+ SUM(A,LIVREAR(T,A)$R(A)*LVPRICE(A,‘PRICEBY’)
$R(A)) + LIVREAR(T – 1,‘MALEC’)
*LVPRICE(‘MALEC’,‘PRICEBY’) 
+ LIVREAR(T – 1,‘FEMALEC’)*LVPRICE(‘FEMALEC’,
‘PRICEBY’) + LIVREAR(T – 2,‘MALEC’)
*LVPRICE(‘MALEC’,‘PRICEBY’) + LIVREAR(T – 2,
‘FEMALEC’)*LVPRICE(‘FEMALEC’,‘PRICEBY’)
LVSTVALOEQ(T) LVSTVALO(T) = LVSTOCKVAL(T) – LVSTVBY(T)
BYLOSSEQ(T) BYLOSS(T) = CRSALLO(T) + BUYFOOD(T) 
+ LVSTSALO(T) + LVSTVALO(T)
BYLOSSNEQ(T) BYLOSSN(T) = BYLOSS(T)/POVLINE(T)
Household Full Income in Each Period
HFINCOME(T) HHINCOME(T) = SUM((C,LAND,FERTL,TECHL),
XCROP(T,C,LAND,FERTL,TECHL)*GYIELD(T,C,LAND,
TECHL,FERTL)*PEXP(C)) – BELGRISK(T) – SHAREP(T)
– SUM(C,XBUYSED(T,C)*PEXP(C)) – SUM(FERT,
FERTBUY(T,FERT)*FERPRICE(FERT,‘PRICE98’)) 












+ VLEISURE(T) – SUM(BTYPE,CREDIT(T,BTYPE)*
CREDINT(BTYPE,‘IRATE’))
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LNCONS(T,S,LAND) SUM((C,FERTL,TECHL),XCROP(T,C,LAND,FERTL,
TECHL)*CLOCUP(C,LAND,TECHL,FERTL,S)) 




LNCONS2(T,LAND) CARECON(T,LAND) + IAREACON(T,LAND) 
+ OWNCNCON(T,LAND) + RENTEDNC(T,LAND) 
+ CARTREE(T,LAND) + RENTOUT(T,LAND) 
+ SUM(TECHL,GRAZEL(T,LAND,TECHL)) 
+ SUM(TECHL,FALLOW(T,LAND,TECHL)) 
= AREA(LAND) + HIRINL(T,LAND)





LNCONS4(T,LAND) RENTEDNC(T,LAND) = SUM((C,FERTL,TECHL),
XCROP(T,C,LAND,FERTL,TECHL)$RENT(TECHL))
Rental Land Constraint
RENTLNDCON(T,LAND) HIRINL(T,LAND) ≤ CONSERL(LAND,‘RENTL’)
HIRINL.L(T,LAND) = CONSERL(LAND,‘RENTL’)
Labor Constraints
SEAXCROP(T,C,S) XCROPLABS(T,C,S) = SUM((LAND,FERTL,TECHL),
XCROP(T,C,LAND,FERTL,TECHL)
*LABORUSE(C,LAND,TECHL,FERTL,S))
CROPLABSEQ(T,S) CROPLABS(T,S) = SUM(C,XCROPLABS(T,C,S))
LVSTLABSEQ(T,S) LVSTLABS(T,S) = LIVBIN(T)*LVLABREQ(‘COWSD’,S)
+ LVLABREQ(‘FOD’,S)*LVSTOCKVAL(T)/1700
ONFLABSEQ(T,S) ONFLABS(T,S) = CROPLABS(T,S) + LVSTLABS(T,S) 
+ LABHAR(T,S) + LABCON(T,S) + LABRCON(T,S) 
+ LABMAN(T,S)
SESLBREQ(T,S) ONFLABS(T,S) = FLABONF(T,S) + HIREDL(T,S)
SEALABAL(T,S) TFLAB(T,S) = FLABONF(T,S) + FLABOFM(T,S) 
+ FLABOXH(T,S)
TFLABEQ(T,S) TFLABS(T,S) = TFLAB(T,S) + FLEISURE(T,S)
Shadow Wage Equations/Drudgery Curves
DRUD1EQ(T,S) DRUD1(T,S) = TFLAB(T,S)/
(TWORK(T)*HBLABS(S,‘LENGTH’))
DRUD2EQ(T,S) DRUD2(T,S) = (DRUD1(T,S) – 5)**2
SVLEISE(T,S) SVALUELS(T,S) = 1.5 + 0.08*DRUD1(T,S) 
+ 0.04*DRUD2(T,S)
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OXENREQ(T,S) OXLABS(T,S) ≤ OXCAPS(T,S) + OXHIREIN(T,S)
OXLABCRSEQ(T,C,S) OXLABCRS(T,C,S) = SUM((LAND,FERTL,TECHL),
XCROP(T,C,LAND,FERTL,TECHL)
*OXENLABU(C,LAND,TECHL,FERTL,S))
OXLABSEQ(T,S) OXLABS(T,S) = SUM(C,OXLABCRS(T,C,S))
OXCAPSEQ(T,S) OXCAPS(T,S) = HBLABS(S,‘OXENLAB’)
*LIVPROD(T,‘OXENPAIR’)
+ HBLABS(S,‘BULLAB’)*LIVPROD(T,‘BULLS’)
OXLEISEQ(T,S) OXLEIS(T,S) = OXCAPS(T,S) – OXLABS(T,S)
OXHIREQ(T,S) OXHIREIN(T,S) = 0.5*FLABOXH(T,S)






+ MANUSE(T – 1)*0.4*MANNUT(NP,‘MANCOM’)
Credit for Fertilizer Constraint
FERTCRED(T) SUM(FERT,FERTBUY(T,FERT)
*FERPRICE(FERT,‘PRICE98’)) ≤ CREDIT(T,‘GC’)
Capital and Credit Constraint
CAPITALC(T) SUM(C,XBUYSED(T,C)*PEXP(C)*(1.05))
+ SUM(S,HIREDL(T,S)*WAGERATE(S,‘WHB’)) 
+ 0.3*CREDIT(T,‘GC’) ≤ INPUTSHARE
*(ALFA(T) + SUM(A,LIVSALE(T – 1,A)$SA(A)
*PEXPA(A)$SA(A)) – SUM(A,LIVBUY(T – 1,A)
*PEXPA(A) + SUM(C,XSELCROP(T – 1,C)*PEXPA(A))))
Liquidity/Cash Constraint
NETCASHEQ1(T) CASHINC(T) = ALFA(T) + SUM(A,LIVSALE(T,A)
$SA(A)*PEXPA(A)$SA(A))
+ SUM(C,XSELCROP(T – 1,C)*PEXP(C))
+ SUM(C,XSTOREDS(T,C)*PEXP(C))
+ SUM(S,FLABOFM(T,S)*WAGERATE(S,‘WHS’))





*(1.05)$CA(A)) + SUM(PAP, BUYANIP(T,PAP)
*ANPRICE(PAP,‘PPRICE’)) + XCRESID(T)*CRESDP
+ SUM(A,LIVBUY(T,A)*PEXPA(A)*(1.05))
+ SUM(BTYPE, CREDIT(T – 1,BTYPE)
*CREDINT(BTYPE,‘IRATE’))
NETCASHEQ3(T) NETCASH(T) = CASHINC(T) – CASHEXP(T)





≤ SUM(A,LIVSALE(T – 1,A)$TLAST(T)$SA(A)
*PEXPA(A)$SA(A)) 
+ SUM(C,XSELCROP(T – 1,C)$TLAST(T)*PEXP(C))
+ SUM(C,XSTOREDS(T – 1,C)$TLAST(T)*PEXP(C))
LVSTSTAB(T) LVSTOCKVAL(T) ≥ 0.8*LVSTOCKVAL(T – 1)
LIVSAL(T)$TLAST(T) SUM(A,LIVSALE(T,A)$TLAST(T)$SA(A)
*PEXPA(A)$SA(A)) ≤ SUM(A,LIVSALE(T – 1,A)
$TLAST(T)$SA(A)*PEXPA(A)$SA(A))
Seed Use Constraints
SEEDEQ1(T,C)$TFIRST(T) XSEED(T,C)$TFIRST(T) = CPRICES(C,‘INSEED’)
SEEDREQ(T,C) SUM((LAND,FERTL,TECHL),XCROP(T,C,LAND,
FERTL,TECHL)*MISC(C,LAND,TECHL,FERTL,‘SEED’))
= XSEED(T,C) + XBUYSED(T,C)
Crop Production Balance






= SHARECR(T,C) + XCONS(T,C) + XSELCROP(T,C) 
+ XSEED(T + 1,C) + XSTORED(T,C)
GROSCROPEQ(T,C) GROSCROP(T,C) = SUM((LAND,FERTL,TECHL),
XCROP(T,C,LAND,FERTL,TECHL)
*GYIELD(T,C,LAND,TECHL,FERTL))
GRCROPMEQ(T,C) GROSCROPM(T,C) = GROSCROP(T,C)$MEHERC(C)
GRCROPBEQ(T,C) GROSCROPB(T,C) = GROSCROP(T,C)$BELGC(C)
NETCROPEQ(T,C) NETCROP(T,C) = GROSCROP(T,C) – SHARECR(T,C)
NETCROPMEQ(T,C) NETCROPM(T,C) = NETCROP(T,C)$MEHERC(C)
NETCROPBEQ(T,C) NETCROPB(T,C) = NETCROP(T,C)$BELGC(C)
PRODBAL2(T,C) XSTORED(T,C) = XSTOREDC(T + 1,C) 
+ XSTOREDS(T + 1,C)
Crop Production Balance in Bad Year
PRODLBYEQ(T,C) PRODLBY(T,C) = SUM((LAND,FERTL,TECHL),
XCROP(T,C,LAND,FERTL,TECHL)$BELGC(C)
*GYIELD(T,C,LAND,TECHL,FERTL)$BELGC(C))
GROSCRBYEQ(T,C) GROSCRBY(T,C) = GROSCROP(T,C) – PRODLBY(T,C)
SHARECBYEQ(T,C) SHARECBY(T,C) = SHARECR(T,C) 
– SHARECR(T,C)$BELGC(C)
NETCRBYEQ(T,C) NETCRBY(T,C) = GROSCRBY(T,C) – SHARECBY(T,C)
CRDISPBYEQ(T,C) NETCRBY(T,C) = XCONSBY(T,C) + XSELCRBY(T,C) 
+ XSEED(T + 1,C) + XSTORBY(T,C) + XBUYCRBY(T,C)
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TCONSEQ(T,C) XTCONS(T,C) = XCONS(T,C) + XBUYCON(T,C) 
+ XSTOREDC(T,C)
BARCONEXEQ(T) BARCONEX(T) = XTCONS(T,‘BARLEYM’)
*PEXP(‘BARLEYM’) + XTCONS(T,‘BARLEYB’)
*PEXP(‘BARLEYB’)
BARCONEQ(T) BARCONEX(T) = 553 + 0.1079*NHHY(T) 
+ 0.000034*NHHY(T)**2
WHECONEQ(T) XTCONS(T,‘WHEAT’) = –203.06 
+ 0.1358*NHHY(T) – 0.0000115*NHHY(T)**2
















Production and Use of Animal Manure
EMANURE(T) DMANURE(T) = SUM(A,LIVPROD(T,A)*MANPYPA(A))
+ SUM(A,LIVREAR(T,A)$R(A)*MANPYPA(A)$R(A))
+ SUM(A,LIVBUY(T,A)$R(A)*MANPYPA(A)$R(A))
+ LIVREAR(T – 1,‘MALEC’)*MANPYPA(‘MALEC’)
+ LIVREAR(T – 1,‘FEMALEC’)*MANPYPA(‘FEMALEC’)
+ LIVREAR(T – 2,‘MALEC’)*MANPYPA(‘MALEC’)
+ LIVREAR(T – 2,‘FEMALEC’)*MANPYPA(‘FEMALEC’)
EMANURE2(T) MANUSE(T) ≤ DMANURE(T)
Fat and Protein Calorie Balance
Fat Calories









60 APPENDIX AProtein Calories
PROTCALE(T) PROTCAL(T) = (SUM(C, XCONS(T,C)
*CPRICES(C,‘PROTEIN’)) + SUM(C, XSTOREDC(T,C)
*CPRICES(C,‘PROTEIN’)) + SUM(C, XBUYCON(T,C)









Protein and Carbohydrate Calories
















TOTCALE(T) TOTCAL(T) = PRCARCAL(T) + FATCAL(T)
NUTRBALF(T) FATCAL(T) ≤ 0.3*TOTCAL(T)
NUTRBALP(T) PROTCAL(T) ≤ 0.15*TOTCAL(T)
FATCALE(T) Total calories from fat
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OWNACONE(T) SUM(A,CONSOWNA(T,A)$SHG(A)) 
+ SUM(A,CONSBAN(T,A)$SHG(A)) ≥ 1
SHOATE(TFIRST,A) CONSOWNA(TFIRST,A)$RAMBK(A) 
$RAMBK(A) ≤ LIVN(A)$RAMBK(A) 
– LIVSALE(TFIRST,A)$RAMBK(A)
Equations for Livestock Follow Now




KEEPCOW(T + 1) LIVPROD(T + 1,‘COWS’) = 0.85*LIVPROD(T,‘COWS’) 
+ LIVBUY(T + 1,‘COWS’) + LIVPROD(T,‘HEIFERS’)
KEEPOX(T + 1) LIVPROD(T + 1,‘OXENPAIR’) = 0.85*LIVPROD(T,
‘OXENPAIR’) + LIVBUY(T + 1,‘OXENPAIR’) 
+ 0.5*LIVPROD(T,‘BULLS’)
KEEPB(T + 1) LIVPROD(T + 1,‘BULLS’) = 0.9
*LIVREAR(T – 2,‘MALEC’) 
+ LIVBUY(T + 1,‘BULLS’) – LIVSALE(T + 1,‘BULLS’)
KEEPHF(T + 1) LIVPROD(T + 1,‘HEIFERS’) = 0.9
*LIVREAR(T – 2,‘FEMALEC’) + LIVBUY(T + 1,
‘HEIFERS’) – LIVSALE(T + 1,‘HEIFERS’)
Adjustments based on survey data collected in 1999/2000 in the study site.
Fifteen percent of the cows and oxen are replaced every year.
It may require up to 3 years for calves to become bulls or heifers.
This implies it may require up to 4 years for calves to become cows or oxen.
Ten percent of the calves may have then died before they become bulls or heifers.
The death rates should be deducted for the animals in the nonreproductive ages when they 
are transferred from period to period.
KEEPEW(T + 1) LIVPROD(T + 1,‘SHEEPEW’) = 0.77
*LIVPROD(T,‘SHEEPEW’) + LIVBUY(T + 1,
‘SHEEPEW’) + 0.8*LIVREAR(T – 2,‘LAMBFEM’)
Twenty-three percent of the ewes and does had to be replaced every year.
It may require up to 3 years for lambs and kids to grow to ewes and does.
Twenty percent of the lambs and kids may have died in the process of rearing.
KEEPDOE(T + 1) LIVPROD(T + 1,‘GOATDOE’) = 0.77
*LIVPROD(T,‘GOATDOE’) + LIVBUY(T + 1,
‘GOATDOE’) + 0.8*LIVREAR(T – 2,‘KIDFEM’)
KEEPRAM(T + 1) LIVPROD(T + 1,‘SHEEPRAM’) = 0.95
*LIVPROD(T,‘SHEEPRAM’) + 0.9*LIVBUY(T,
‘LAMBMALE’) +  0.8*LIVREAR(T – 1,
‘LAMBMALE’) + LIVBUY(T + 1,‘SHEEPRAM’) 
– CONSOWNA(T + 1,‘SHEEPRAM’)
– LIVSALE(T + 1,‘SHEEPRAM’)
62 APPENDIX AKEEPBUK(T + 1) LIVPROD(T + 1,‘GOATBUCK’) = 0.95
*LIVPROD(T,‘GOATBUCK’) + 0.9*LIVBUY(T,
‘KIDMALE’) + 0.8*LIVREAR(T – 1,‘KIDMALE’) 
+ LIVBUY(T + 1,‘GOATBUCK’) 
– CONSOWNA(T + 1,‘GOATBUCK’)
– LIVSALE(T + 1,‘GOATBUCK’)
KEEPHN(T + 1) LIVPROD(T + 1,‘HEN’) = 0.75*LIVPROD(T,‘HEN’) 
+ LIVBUY(T + 1,‘HEN’) + LIVREAR(T,‘CHICKEN’)
The death rate for rams and bucks is 5 percent, but 20 percent of the male kids and lambs
may die in the rearing process (10 percent die in one year).
Calf Balance
MCALFB(T) LIVREAR(T,‘MALEC’) + LIVSALE(T,‘MALEC’) 
= 0.25*LIVPROD(T,‘COWS’)
FCALFB(T) LIVREAR(T,‘FEMALEC’) + LIVSALE(T,‘FEMALEC’) 
= 0.25*LIVPROD(T,‘COWS’)
The calving rate of a cow is 50 percent (i.e., calves every second year).
This means a cow calves every second year.
The sex ratio of the calves is 50 percent.
Productive life of cows and oxen is 10 years—culling rate is 10 percent.
The mortality rate for cows and oxen is 5 percent.
This means the replacement rate for a cow or oxen is 15 percent per annum.
Lamb Balance
MALLAMB(T) LIVREAR(T,‘LAMBMALE’) + CONSOWNA(T,






The lambing rate for sheep is 72 percent (i.e., a ewe lambs one time in 1.39 years)
The litter size is 1.12.
The sex ratio is 50 percent.
Kid Balance
MALKID(T) LIVREAR(T,‘KIDMALE’) + CONSOWNA(T,‘KIDMALE’)
+ LIVSALE(T,‘KIDMALE’) = 0.423
*LIVPROD(T, ‘GOATDOE’)
FMLKID(T) LIVREAR(T,‘KIDFEM’) + CONSOWNA(T,‘KIDFEM’) 
+ LIVSALE(T,‘KIDFEM’) = 0.423
*LIVPROD(T, ‘GOATDOE’)
The lambing rate for ewes is 60 percent (i.e., a ewe lambs one time in 1.66 years).
The litter size is 1.41.
The sex ratio is 50 percent.
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The death rate for a ewe or doe is 10 percent.
Replacement rate is 23 percent.
Chicken Balance
CHICKNB(T) LIVREAR(T,‘CHICKEN’) + LIVSALE(T,‘CHICKEN’) 
+ CONSOWNA(T,‘CHICKEN’) + EGGSOWN(T)
= 15*LIVPROD(T,‘HEN’)
Livestock Wealth




+ SUM(A,LIVREAR(T – 1,‘MALEC’)
*LVPRICE(‘MALEC’,‘PPRICE’))
+ SUM(A,LIVREAR(T – 1,‘FEMALEC’)
*LVPRICE(‘FEMALEC’,‘PPRICE’)) 
+ SUM(A,LIVREAR(T – 2,‘MALEC’)
*LVPRICE(‘MALEC’,‘PPRICE’))
+ SUM(A,LIVREAR(T – 2,‘FEMALEC’)
*LVPRICE(‘FEMALEC’,‘PPRICE’))
LVSTVALE(T) LVSTOCKVE(T) = SUM(A,LIVPROD(T,A)$E(A)
*PEXPA(A)$E(A)) + SUM(A,LIVREAR(T,A)$R(A)
*PEXPA(A)$R(A)) + SUM(A,LIVREAR(T – 1,
‘MALEC’)*PEXPA(‘MALEC’)) 
+ SUM(A,LIVREAR(T – 1,‘FEMALEC’)
*PEXPA(‘FEMALEC’)) + SUM(A,LIVREAR(T – 2,
‘MALEC’)*PEXPA(‘MALEC’)) 











TSEROSEQ(T) TSEROS(T) = SUM(LAND,TSOILER(T,LAND))
Cumulative Soil Erosion
CUMSER1(T,LAND) CTSOILER(T,LAND)$(ORD(T) EQ 1) 
$(ORD(T) EQ 1) = TSOILER(T,LAND)$(ORD(T) EQ 1)
CUMSERT(T,LAND) CTSOILER(T,LAND) = CTSOILER(T – 1,LAND) 
+ TSOILER(T,LAND)
64 APPENDIX AN and P Balance Overtime
*TNPE(T,NP,LAND) TNPSTOCK(T,NP,LAND) = ISTOCKNP(LAND,NP)
*(AREA(LAND) + HIRINL(T,LAND))
– CTSOILER(T,LAND)*1000*CONSERL(LAND,NP)
*NPSTOK1(T,NP,LAND) CNPSTOCK(T,NP,LAND) = TNPSTOCK(T,NP,LAND) 
– 0.01*TNPSTOCK(T,NP,LAND)
Investment in Soil Conservation
SCONSBAL(T,LAND) SUM((C,FERTL,TECHL),XCROP(T,C,LAND,FERTL,
TECHL)$CTCH(TECHL)) + GRAZEL(T,LAND,‘CONS’) 
+ FALLOW(T,LAND,‘CONS’) = CARECON(T,LAND) 
+ IAREACON(T,LAND)
LABORCON(T) TLABCONS(T) = SUM(LAND,(CARECON(T,LAND) 
– CARECON(T – 1,LAND))*CONSERL(LAND,
‘CONSLH’)) + SUM(LAND,CARECON(T – 1,LAND)
*CONSERL(LAND,‘MAINTH’)) + SUM(LAND,
IAREACON(T,LAND)*CONSERL(LAND,‘MAINTH’))
CONSBAL2(T,LAND) CARECON(T,LAND) ≥ CARECON(T – 1,LAND)
Land Cultivated without Conservation
CONSBAL3(T,LAND) SUM((C,FERTL,TECHL),XCROP(T,C,LAND,FERTL,
TECHL)$NCTCH(TECHL)) = OWNCNCON(T,LAND) 
+ RENTEDNC(T,LAND)
Disinvestment in Soil Conservation
REMCONSE(T,LAND) CONSREM(T,LAND)  = CONSERL(LAND,‘IAREACON’)
– CUMAREM(T – 1,LAND) – IAREACON(T,LAND)
CUMAREME(T,LAND) CUMAREM(T,LAND)$(ORD(T) EQ 1)
$(ORD(T) EQ 1) = CONSREM(T,LAND)$(ORD(T) EQ 1)
CUMAREM2(T,LAND) CUMAREM(T,LAND) = CUMAREM(T – 1,LAND) 
+ CONSREM(T,LAND)
CUMAREM3(T,LAND) CUMAREM(T,LAND) ≤ CONSERL(LAND,‘IAREACON’)
Soil Erosion on Fallow and Grazing Land









Soil Erosion on Non-Conserved Land
SERNCON(T,LAND) SUM((C,FERTL,TECHL),XCROP(T,C,LAND,FERTL,
TECHL)$NCTCH(TECHL)*MISC(C,LAND,TECHL,
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= TSEROSNC(T,LAND)
Average Soil Erosion on Conserved Land
SERCON2(T,LAND) AVGECONL(T,LAND) = TSERCON(T,LAND)/
(CARECON(T,LAND) + IAREACON(T,LAND))
Average Soil Erosion on Non-Conserved Land
SERCON3(T,LAND) AVENCONL(T,LAND) = TSEROSNC(T,LAND)/
(OWNCNCON(T,LAND) + RENTEDNC(T,LAND))
Cumulative Average Soil Erosion with Conservation
CUMSECO1(T,LAND) CUSERCON(T,LAND)$(ORD(T) EQ 1)
$(ORD(T) EQ 1) = AVGECONL(T,LAND)$(ORD(T) EQ 1)
CUMSECO2(T,LAND) CUSERCON(T,LAND) = CUSERCON(T – 1,LAND) 
+ AVGECONL(T,LAND)
Cumulative Average Soil Erosion without Conservation
CUMSENC1(T,LAND) CUSENCON(T,LAND)$(ORD(T) EQ 1)
$(ORD(T) EQ 1) = AVENCONL(T,LAND)$(ORD(T) EQ 1)
CUMSENC2(T,LAND) CUSENCON(T,LAND) = CUSENCON(T – 1,LAND) 
+ AVENCONL(T,LAND)
Cumulative Soil Erosion on Fallow and Grazing Land
CUMSEFAL(T,LAND) CUSERFAL(T,LAND)$(ORD(T) EQ 1) 
$(ORD(T) EQ 1) = EROSFAL(T,LAND)$(ORD(T) EQ 1)
CUMSFAL2(T,LAND) CUSERFAL(T,LAND) = CUSERFAL(T – 1,LAND) 
+ EROSFAL(T,LAND)
Computation of Change in Soil Depth for the Intercept Term 
(the yield depth function)
DEPTHCE(T,LAND) DEPTHCON(T,LAND) = CONSERL(LAND,‘SDEPTH’) 
– 0.01*CUSERCON(T,LAND)
DEPTHNCE(T,LAND) DEPTHNCO(T,LAND) = CONSERL(LAND,‘SDEPTH’) 
– 0.01*CUSENCON(T,LAND)
Computation of the Yields Intercept Term











66 APPENDIX AArea Cropped with and without Conservation
TOTACONE(T,LAND) TOTACONS(T,LAND) = CARECON(T,LAND) 




N and P Balance with and without Conservation Overtime
TNPECON(T,TECHL, NPSTOCKC(T,TECHL,NP,LAND) = 
NP,LAND) (ISTOCKNP(LAND,NP) – CUSERCON(T,LAND)*2
*CONSERL(LAND,NP))$CTCH(TECHL)
+ (ISTOCKNP(LAND,NP) – CUSENCON(T,LAND)*2
*CONSERL(LAND,NP))$NCTCH(TECHL)
An enrichment factor of 2 is used
NPSTOK1(T,‘CONS’, CNPSTOCK(T,‘CONS’,NP,LAND)
NP,LAND) = NPSTOCKC(T,‘CONS’,NP,LAND) 
– 0.01*NPSTOCKC(T,‘CONS’,NP,LAND)
NPSTOK2(T,TECHL, CNPSTOCK(T,TECHL,NP,LAND)$NCTCH(TECHL)
NP,LAND)$NCTCH = NPSTOCKC(T,TECHL,NP,LAND)$NCTCH(TECHL) 
(TECHL) – 0.01*NPSTOCKC(T,TECHL,NP,LAND)$NCTCH(TECHL)
NPAVALE(T,TECHL, NPAVAIL(T,TECHL,NP,LAND) 
NP,LAND)$(ORD(T) =  CNPSTOCK(T,TECHL,NP,LAND) 
EQ 1) – CNPSTOCK(T,TECHL,NP,LAND)
NPAVALE2(T,TECHL, NPAVAIL(T,TECHL,NP,LAND) 
NP,LAND)$(ORD(T) =  0.01*1000*(CNPSTOCK(T,TECHL,NP,LAND) 
GT 1) – CNPSTOCK(T – 1,TECHL,NP,LAND))
Cumulative Change in N and P Availability
CNPCHAN(T,TECHL,NP, CNPCH(T,TECHL,NP,LAND)$(ORD(T) EQ 1)
LAND)$(ORD(T) EQ 1) = NPAVAIL(T,TECHL,NP,LAND)$(ORD(T) EQ 1)
CNPCHAN2(T,TECHL, CNPCH(T,TECHL,NP,LAND) 
NP,LAND) = CNPCH(T – 1,TECHL,NP,LAND) 
+ NPAVAIL(T,TECHL,NP,LAND)
Estimation of Crop Yields after Erosion and N Depletion
GYIELDE(T,C,LAND, GYIELD(T,C,LAND,TECHL,FERTL) 











A DYNAMIC NON-SEPARABLE FARM HOUSEHOLD MODEL 67Fertilizer Nutrients N and P Supply
FERTUNP(T,NP,LAND) SUM((C,FERTL,TECHL),XCROP(T,C,LAND,FERTL,
TECHL)*FERTZ(NP,FERTL)) = FERTNP(T,NP,LAND)
Summing Up on Certain Computed Variables
CULTA(T,LAND) SUM((C,FERTL,TECHL), XCROP(T,C,LAND,FERTL,
TECHL)) = ACULT(T,LAND)







TOTLABE(T) LABDEM(T) = SUM(S,FLABONF(T,S)) 
+ SUM(S,HIREDL(T,S))
CARELAG(T,LAND) PARECON(T,LAND) = CARECON(T,LAND) 
– CARECON(T – 1,LAND)
LABMANE(T) TLABMAN(T) = MANURL*0.001*MANUSE(T)
LABMAN2(T) TLABMAN(T) = SUM(S,LABMAN(T,S))
LABCULT(T) LABFARM(T) = LABDEM(T) – TLABCONS(T)
LABRCONE(T) TLABRCON(T) = SUM(LAND,CONSREM(T,LAND)
*CONSERL(LAND,‘LREMCON’))
TFLABONF(T) TFLABON(T) = SUM(S,FLABONF(T,S))
TFLABOF(T) TFLABOFF(T) = SUM(S,FLABOFM(T,S))
TFLEISR(T) TLEISURE(T) = SUM(S,FLEISURE(T,S))
THIRLAB(T) THIREDL(T) = SUM(S,HIREDL(T,S))
TLBCON(T) TLABCONS(T) = SUM(S,LABCON(T,S))
TLBRCON(T) TLABRCON(T) = SUM(S,LABRCON(T,S))
TFLAHOX(T) TFLABHOX(T) = SUM(S,FLABOXH(T,S))
Land Renting by Soil Category
REGHIRE(T) HIREIREG(T) = SUM(LAND,HIRINL(T,LAND)
$REGOSOL(LAND))
ANDHIRE(T) HIREIAND(T) = SUM(LAND,HIRINL(T,LAND)
$ANDOSOL(LAND))
LAROTL(T) RENTUTL(T) = SUM(LAND,RENTOUT(T,LAND))
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Seasonality and Labor Allocation in the Model: 
Example Output for Model Validation
Shadow Value of Leisure (birr per man-day) by Season and Year (Variable SVALUELS.L)
Year January February March–May June July August September October November December
1 6.065 3.616 4.399 8.498 9.031 6.141 3.914 4.699 5.144 7.080
2 5.842 3.000 3.817 8.533 9.066 5.791 3.568 4.351 4.795 6.851
3 6.064 3.000 3.873 8.620 9.505 5.937 3.715 4.497 4.942 7.079
4 5.897 3.000 3.484 8.620 9.429 5.715 3.491 4.274 4.719 6.908
5 5.416 3.000 3.272 8.311 8.840 5.235 3.000 3.774 4.228 6.417
Total Crop Labor by Season (Variable CROPLABS.L)
Year January February March–May June July August September October November December
1 28.513 10.360 5.026 32.696 17.777 4.024 17.770 21.604 9.068 14.453
2 27.368 9.631 4.184 30.828 15.226 4.228 16.494 22.279 8.897 13.422
3 29.784 11.993 5.795 24.708 14.055 4.411 15.090 16.130 11.778 17.038
4 23.082 9.993 5.771 20.997 12.841 4.008 12.303 14.182 10.937 14.360
5 17.817 7.223 6.932 19.465 11.721 4.324 10.364 17.086 9.775 11.612
Livestock Labor by Season (Variable LVSTLABS.L)
Year January February March–May June July August September October November December
1 20.259 22.012 46.294 25.518 25.518 22.012 20.259 20.259 20.259 20.259
2 20.041 21.721 45.205 25.082 25.082 21.721 20.041 20.041 20.041 20.041
3 19.838 21.451 44.191 24.676 24.676 21.451 19.838 19.838 19.838 19.838
4 19.670 21.226 43.348 24.339 24.339 21.226 19.670 19.670 19.670 19.670
5 19.230 20.639 41.148 23.459 23.459 20.639 19.230 19.230 19.230 19.230
69On-Farm Labor by Season (Variable ONFLABS.L)
Year January February March–May June July August September October November December
1 48.772 32.371 91.073 58.213 43.295 26.036 38.029 41.863 29.327 34.712
2 47.409 33.756 64.660 55.910 40.308 25.950 36.535 42.320 28.938 33.463
3 49.622 33.444 94.416 49.384 38.731 25.861 34.928 35.968 31.617 36.877
4 42.752 31.219 117.408 45.336 37.180 25.234 31.972 33.852 30.607 34.029
5 37.047 36.245 115.750 42.924 35.180 24.963 29.593 36.316 29.004 30.842
Labor Used for Removal of 




Labor Used for Conservation in 








Labor Used for Manure Distribution 








Off-Farm Family Labor Used in Each Season (man-days) (Variable FLABOFM.L)
Year January February March–May June July August September October November December
1 1.540 5.134 35.664 1.382 41.786 24.604 1.385 1.994 16.779 19.732
2 3.114 54.576 5.236 22.668 24.342 1.545 0.662 16.484 21.373
3 3.132 1.122 28.778 13.541 27.248 26.316 5.083 8.893 15.679 20.209
4 10.488 4.177 0.523 19.099 30.120 27.136 7.391 10.755 16.598 23.713
5 15.075 21.890 31.617 26.212 6.652 6.061 16.383 26.110
70 APPENDIX BFamily Leisure Time in Each Season (man-days) (Variable FLEISURE.L)
Year January February March–May June July August September October November December
1 9.699 18.974 60.353 0.414 2.155 16.430 10.006 12.622 13.904 12.626
2 10.928 24.079 72.345 0.304 2.088 18.388 12.526 14.854 16.028 13.843
3 10.171 24.657 72.984 0.648 18.151 11.809 14.363 15.630 13.243
4 11.195 25.249 82.956 0.925 19.646 13.701 16.039 17.231 14.274
5 13.859 25.855 89.958 1.167 3.066 22.569 18.092 19.724 20.595 16.792
Total Family Labor Available in Each Season (Variable TFLABS)
Year January February March–May June July August September October November December
1 60.010 56.480 187.090 60.010 63.540 67.070 49.420 56.480 60.010 67.070
2 61.450 57.836 191.580 61.450 65.065 68.680 50.606 57.836 61.450 68.680
3 62.925 59.224 196.178 62.925 66.627 70.328 51.821 59.224 62.925 70.328
4 64.435 60.645 200.886 64.435 68.226 72.016 53.064 60.645 64.435 72.016
5 65.982 62.100 205.708 65.982 69.863 73.744 54.338 62.100 65.982 73.744
Total Seasonal Family Labor Use (Variable TFLAB.L)
Year January February March–May June July August September October November December
1 50.311 37.506 126.737 59.596 61.385 50.640 39.414 43.858 46.106 54.444
2 50.523 33.756 119.235 61.146 62.977 50.291 38.080 42.982 45.422 54.836
3 52.754 34.566 123.194 62.925 65.979 52.177 40.011 44.861 47.295 57.085
4 53.240 35.396 117.931 64.435 67.301 52.370 39.364 44.606 47.204 57.742
5 52.122 36.245 115.750 64.814 66.797 51.175 36.245 42.376 45.387 56.952
Seasonal Oxen Labor Use (Variable OXLABS.L)
Year January February March–May June July August September October November December
1 14.026 11.354 1.938 17.000 17.596 0 12.183 7.712 4.434 10.997
2 12.929 10.051 1.696 17.000 15.724 0 10.288 6.383 6.249 10.837
3 16.937 15.645 3.312 13.145 13.206 0 9.595 5.696 2.436 9.833
4 14.937 14.323 3.283 10.579 11.282 0 9.140 5.473 2.436 6.917
5 15.495 11.126 4.444 10.071 9.486 0 8.503 5.433 2.040 5.379
Seasonal Oxen Labor Capacity (Variable OXCAPS.L)
Year January February March–May June July August September October November December
1 19.400 18.400 53.000 17.000 20.700 19.000 14.000 18.400 17.000 21.700
2 19.400 18.400 53.000 17.000 20.700 19.000 14.000 18.400 17.000 21.700
3 19.400 18.400 53.000 17.000 20.700 19.000 14.000 18.400 17.000 21.700
4 19.400 18.400 53.000 17.000 20.700 19.000 14.000 18.400 17.000 21.700
5 17.000 16.000 53.000 17.000 18.000 19.000 14.000 16.000 17.000 19.000
SEASONALITY AND LABOR ALLOCATION IN THE MODEL 71Seasonal Oxen Leisure (Variable OXLEIS.L)
Year January February March–May June July August September October November December
1 5.374 7.046 51.062 3.104 19.000 1.817 10.688 12.566 10.703
2 6.471 8.349 51.304 4.976 19.000 3.712 12.017 10.751 10.863
3 2.463 2.755 49.688 3.855 7.494 19.000 4.405 12.704 14.564 11.867
4 4.463 4.077 49.717 6.421 9.418 19.000 4.860 12.927 14.564 14.783
5 1.505 4.874 48.556 6.929 8.514 19.000 5.497 10.567 14.960 13.621
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